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Annual 7 Chapter 10

A Nazi Crusade?
by Richard Breitman

Arno J. Mayer. Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The "Final Solution" in History. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. 492 pages.

In the prologue to his study, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken, Arno J. Mayer, Dayton-Stockton Professor of European History at Princeton University, maintains that survivor accounts of the Jewish catastrophe during World War II have rigidified into a creed of the Holocaust, a "cult of remembrance" that detaches the Jewish experience from its historical context. Mayer consequently avoids the term Holocaust, preferring Final Solution or Judeocide. He also warns that this subject is too complex and important to be left primarily to Jewish and German historians.1 Going to considerable lengths to supply what he regards as the proper background, Mayer ends up giving the context more attention than the Final Solution itself.

This book may be understood partly as a quest for an explanation of the forces that engulfed part of Mayer's Luxembourg Jewish family, whose experiences are described in a personal preface. Even more, it is a continuation of Mayer's longstanding claims regarding the destructive influence of Europe's pre-industrial elites in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and Europe's virulent hostility toward Russia's new Bolshevik regime as well as its left-wing allies and sympathizers. Mayer has developed both themes in previous books.2 In this study, he attacks his favorite targets frequently, however much he has to force the material to fit.

Mayer begins with two surprising analogies. He asserts that the Judeocide was similar in certain ways to the First Crusade as well as to the "General Crisis and Thirty Years'War" of the seventeenth century. Both the First Crusade and the Thirty Years'War represent "holy wars," wars fought in the name of religion, during which soldiers indiscriminately murdered innocent civilians. He later argues that Nazi antiBolshevism represented a secularized form of religion that similarly permitted any and all excesses by latter-day Nazi crusaders.3

There were, of course, many other examples of religious wars and killings of Jews or other religious enemies in European history. Mayer selected the First Crusade because it set a disastrous precedent and because the killings of Jews in Europe were an unintended repercussion of the original goal. With the blessings of Pope Urban II, two very different forces, knights and popular pilgrims -counterparts of what Mayer calls the elites and the masses in the twentieth century -set out to liberate the Holy Land from the infidel. Unprepared for the tremendous difficulties of the trek to the Near East and frustrated by the hardships, many of the pilgrims listened to calls to eliminate the unbelievers Jews) along their route. The result was a terrifying outburst of pogroms. Mayer's title, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken, is borrowed from a passage from Solomon bar Simson's chronicle of the massacres of Jews in towns and cities along the Rhine and the Moselle in the late eleventh century.4

The analysis of the First Crusade is designed to prepare the reader for Mayer's argument later that the Nazis first set out to conquer a vast empire in the East and only turned against the Jews in medias res. Yet there are obvious historical differences between the First Crusade and the Final Solution. If Pope Urban 11 sanctioned the liberation of the Holy Land, he did not sanction the pogroms -though he did not condemn them. The Nazi regime had and used the resources of a modem state to persecute and kill Jews as efficiently as possible; the crusaders and pilgrims employed mob violence. The Final Solution was a scheme for all the Jews of Europe; the First Crusade hit a much smaller sample. Moreover, medieval Jews were sometimes able to escape death threats through conversion. Mayer gives these differences little or no weight in his presentation.

Mayer considers the Thirty Years'War relevant not only because its religious passions resulted in huge civilian casualties (more the result of famine and disease than of battle casualties or massacres of civilians), but also because this war was allegedly the product of a general crisis in European society. He argues later that fundamental political, social, and economic contradictions in European states produced a so-called Thirty Years'War (1914~1945) of the twentieth century. Moreover, he claims that the image of the original Thirty Years' War -the "myth and lore of holy war"-had remained alive under the surface;5 it was "revitalized" three centuries later. Thus, Mayer's link between these two wars is fairly direct.

A more familiar reading of European history is that the Thirty Years' War was only partly religious in nature. Catholic France opposed the Hapsburg drive for hegemony; France and Protestant Sweden cooperated. The destruction and exhaustion produced by the Thirty Years' War made a recurrence of religious war in Europe most unlikely. The Peace of Westphalia formally ratified the existence of different religions - if not all religions - ignoring the Pope's protest. The wars of the late 1600s and the 1700s (pre- 1792) were dynastic conflicts without great causes. Mayer does not specify the means by which a positive ideal of a holy war survived under the surface into the nineteenth century, let alone into the twentieth.

Mayer claims that pogroms and mass killings of Jews during the Russian civil war and in the wake of the civil wars in Eastern Europe after World War I foreshadowed the mass murder of the Jews during World War 11.6 He treats the interwar conditions of Jews in Russia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary at considerable length, setting the stage for his claim that Eastern European societies played a major role in the Judeocide during the war, largely because of the widespread association of Jews with Bolshevism. It is less clear why he also surveys the condition of French, British, and Italian Jewry.7 This broad coverage of Western Europe does, however, allow him to make comparisons with Eastern Europe. Mayer maintains that traditional Judeophobia was more pervasive in the East, but not inherently more lethal, than the new antisemitism in the developed countries.8

There are several problems here. The association of Jews with Bolsheviks was, of course, not "traditional" Judeophobia in Eastern Europe, and antisemitism was not generally lethal in the developed countries other than Nazi Germany or those countries cooperating with Germany. Yet Mayer finds the immediate post-World War I era in Eastern Europe more relevant to the Final Solution than antisemitism in the Second Reich or in Weimar Germany.9

Mayer's analysis of Weimar Germany does not emphasize antisemitism. He argues that the old elites seeking to preserve their positions of class, status, and power and a resentful lower-middle class with roots in the past combined to provide the Nazis with support needed to rise to power; sectors of big business were only a junior partner.10 He diverges from the careful statistical research of Thomas Childers and Michael Kater, who have shown that both the Nazi voters and the party membership were broadly drawn from a wide range of classes. Childers explicitly denies that Nazi voters were confined to the lower-middle class and socially marginal elements; he traces significant Nazi voting from the upper-middle class and blue-collar workers.11 Kater finds that the lower-middle class is overrepresented among the Nazi Party members, and the elite slightly so, but concludes that the Nazi movement included and integrated representatives from all segments of society.12 Both Childers and Kater contrast the broad Nazi social base with the narrower bases of the other parties.

For Mayer, Hitler and the old elites cooperated on the basis of certain common values and interests, including war, conquest, and antiBolshevism.13 in spite of Mayer's assertion that the old elites in Germany were not strongly antisemitic, he gives them an important role in the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Their acceptance of the Nazi assault on the Left unwittingly cleared the way for the Nazi drive against the Jews.14 In most cases, this collaboration between the Nazis and the old elites is described in terms of a bargain among equals, but Mayer occasionally shifts the balance: "As in the cases of Hitler and Himmler, Bouhler and Brack did not rise to the top by themselves but were put there by Germany's upper ten thousand."15 This kind of language surely understates the weight of Hitler and other leading Nazis, who personally detested and distrusted the traditional aristocracy, civil service, and officer corps, and whose own political achievements had something to do with Nazi electoral successes and with the Machtergreifung.

There are a large number of factual errors, not mere typographical errors, in the sections of the book on Nazi Germany. Mayer states that nearly 200 synagogues were desecrated during Kristallnacht.16 The actual number is more than 1,000 destroyed. Mayer lists the ex-Kaiser's son, the former Crown Prince, as Friedrich Wilhelm; his name was August Wilhelm.17 Reich Physicians' Leader Gerhard Wagner appears repeatedly as Gerhardt, and Gerhard Maurer, too, is given as Gerhardt; Hinrich Lohse appears as Heinrich Lohse.18

Mayer writes that Hitler appointed Himmler as Reich Leader SS as well as Chief of the German Police on 17 June 1936.19 Actually, Himmler had held the title Reich Leader SS since 1929; he gained the additional "Chief of the German Police" in June 1936. Mayer claims that Reich Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick and justice Minister Franz Gurtner were "on the security side" along with Heydrich in November 1938;20 in reality, Frick had vainly tried to rein in Himmler, and Gurtner was an even older rival of the Reich Leader SS.21

Mayer claims that before the German attack on Poland Hitler said nothing about breaking Poland's ruling and governing class, smothering its culture, and enslaving its population.22 This statement overlooks Hitler's speech of 22 August 1939, 23 in which he declared, according to one surviving record:

Our strength is in our quickness and our brutality. Genghis Khan had millions of women and children killed by his own will and with a gay heart. History sees only in him a great state builder .... Thus for the time being I have sent to the East only my "Death's Head Units" with the order to kill without pity or mercy all men, women, and children of Polish race or language. Only in such a way will we win the vital space that we need. Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?24
On 1 September, the day the invasion of Poland began, Commander Theodor Eicke informed the three SS Death's Head regiments assembled outside Berlin (at Oranienburg) that they would conduct police and security operations behind German lines in Poland. Eicke declared that they would have to carry out the harshest orders without hesitation; in order to protect Hitler's state, the SS would have to incarcerate or annihilate every enemy of National Socialism.25 The Death's Head regiments did kill leading Poles and Jews, even if they did not carry out anything as extreme as Hitler's reported threat.

Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski is listed as a one-time high security official in the Warthegau; he was the Higher SS and Police Leader in Silesia. Mayer mistakenly states that all the German annexations of Polish territory were consolidated into a single province, the Warthegau.26 Actually, the existing provinces of East Prussia and Silesia, the latter divided in 1941 into separate provinces of Upper and Lower Silesia, expanded at the expense of Poland. The Warthegau was only one of two new German territorial units, the other being DanzigWest Prussia. This error might easily have been avoided, since the standard work on the Final Solution, Raul Hilberg's The Destruction of the European Jews, clearly explains the territorial changes.27 One consequence of his misconception is that Mayer locates AuschwitzBirkenau in the Warthegau, although it actually was located in the province of Upper Silesia.28 Such errors (there are others) do not bear directly on Mayer's interpretation, but they call into question his grasp of the material. A book about the Final Solution that mislocates Auschwitz does not inspire confidence.

In other cases, inaccurate or misleading statements allow Mayer to draw conclusions that are unwarranted. For instance, Mayer claims that most German Jews did not emigrate during the first five years of the Third Reich because they refused to believe that the Nazis would completely ostracize, humiliate, or expel them, and because they had a sense of absolute belonging in Germany. A few pages later he more specifically observes that those who did emigrate favored Western Europe, rather than the United States, probably because they hoped to return to Germany. Mayer points out that between 1933 and 1938 only 27,000 came to the United States, although under the quota almost that many could have come in a single year.29 Both his general conclusions and the specific argument are inaccurate, even though there were obviously some German Jews who fit his description.

Mayer lists in his bibliography two articles by Herbert Strauss that detail massive German Jewish efforts to emigrate, which were frustrated both by Nazi restrictions on the amount of property an emigrant could take out of the country and by the walls against immigrants, particularly Jewish immigrants, raised by most of the likely places of refuge abroad.30 In fact, the United States was a particularly desirable destination for German Jews, but American immigration regulations and consular decisions kept most German Jews out. Until 1938 the legal barrier to German Jewish emigration to the United States was not the German quota itself, but administrative regulations: the government documents a German applicant had to supply to an American consul, the need for applicants to demonstrate that they were not "likely to become a public charge," and the lack of financial sponsors who were close relatives already in the states.31

The author's description of Hitler is contradictory. Mayer correctly observes that antisernitism permeated Hitler's world view; he regarded Jews as the chief poisoners and parasites in the modern world. In the next paragraph, Mayer denies that antisernitism was the "core of Hitler's presumption" or that it was more important than anti-Marxism or antiBolshevism. (Here it is necessary to remember that a convinced racist believes first and foremost in the influence of race, not ideology.) On the next page, Mayer concedes that inwardly antisemitism may have been Hitler's core idea and consuming passion, but maintains that his public discourse and Nazi ritual did not put antisernitism first.32 What matters more, what Hitler really thought and felt, or his discourse and Nazi ritual? Later Mayer claims that if Hitler had any long-range objectives, Lebensraum in the East ranked first among them, and that until the fall of 1941 the drive against the Jews was "indeterminate and erratic."33

Mayer specifically rejects a host of other propositions about the Final Solution. We are told that the destruction of the Jews was not Hitler's primary motive for seeking power and going to war; that the Nazi policies of disenfranchising, excluding, and expelling Jews were not calculated steps toward a predetermined goal of extermination; that even in 1940 there was no intention or plan to exterminate the Jews; and that the use of the Einsatzgruppen in Austria and Czechoslovakia was not related to the Jewish question. Mayer strains credulity beyond the breaking point when he claims that Nazi leaders at first "undoubtedly" did not notice that the acquisition of more territory simply gave them more Jews to dispose of and placed a solution of the Jewish question further from their reach.34

All these negations are aimed against what has become known as the "intentionalist" interpretation of Hitler and the Final Solution, although Mayer nowhere identifies his specific adversaries, let alone presents their arguments. In other cases, Mayer rejects claims not closely associated with any scholar. He tells us, for example, that the Third Reich did not invade Poland and the Soviet Union simply to capture their Jews.35 I do not know of any scholar who claims this capture was Hitler's sole purpose.

Mayer's most important positive proposition is that the Nazis originally intended to relocate Jews east of the Ural Mountains. Only when the war against the Soviets turned sour late in 1941, did they lash out in fear and frustration against Europe's Jews, whom they associated with the Bolsheviks.36 Hitler himself threatened on numerous occasions, before and after December 1941, to exterminate European Jewry; he did also make statements about sending them to Madagascar or east of the Urals -in some cases even after the killing was underway. Loose talk (or deception) is less significant, however, than what was actually planned and carried out. No one has uncovered any SS plans for the relocation of Jews in the Soviet interior. In contrast, plans for extermination camps were already being implemented in the early fall of 1941.37

Mayer's argument about military frustration leads him to spend much of the second half of the book tracing the vicissitudes of the German military effort in the East. His most specific claim is that the blunting of the German assault before Moscow in December 1941 (Operation Typhoon) was the turning point that robbed Hitler and his generals of their confidence, made them despair of victory, and caused them to attack the hated Jews within their reach.38 Mayer makes little distinction between the Fuhrer and the professional military experts in this regard; and the military's involvement in the mass executions of Jews, Communist officials, and Russian POWs provides him with another opportunity to indict the old elites. The military command structure and some of the generals were indeed involved in the liquidations. The argument about military frustration, however, is dubious. In the first place, there is no reliable contemporary evidence explicitly drawing this link between the military situation and the Final Solution; even if we accept Mayer's selection of relevant events, his argument is post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Moreover, respected military historians do not see Hitler as perceiving a turning point in December 1941.39 We are given no reason why Hitler, who believed in the complete inferiority of the Slavs, should have been so pessimistic about the military situation so early.

In some places, Mayer himself varies the psychological turning point for Hitler and the generals. Thus, according to Mayer, as of late July 1941, Hitler and his generals realized that they had been overly optimistic, if not mistaken, about an early breakdown of the Bolshevik regime; Hitler then shared the "somber diagnosis" of his generals that Germany could not win a drawn-out two-front war. The fierce battle for Kiev in September 1941 threw off the German timetable and allegedly accounted for Babi Yar; "wounded pride" fueled the Nazis' fury. In contrast, we are told that even in early 1945, "Hitler continued to underestimate the Red Army, as he always had. He dismissed reports about its capability to launch yet another winter drive."40 Why then would Hitler have been "despondent" in December 1941?

The biggest defect in Mayer's argument is that plans for the Final Solution and the early stages of implementation predate what he claims is the military- psychological turning point. Military defeat cannot, therefore, explain the origins of the Final Solution; the reasoning is faulty.

Aware of the need for a logical sequence of events, Mayer either ignores or reinterprets what is known about the Final Solution in the summer of 1941. For example, he raises the question of when the order to exterminate Jews at Auschwitz was given, and without offering any supporting evidence, judges that the command came in the late winter of 1941-42. Then he adds that Rudolf Hoss, the commandant, was probably the last to learn the plan.41 After the war, Hoss testified that in the summer of 1941 Himmler had summoned him to Berlin and given him word of the Final Solution.42 Even a person whose recollections are hazy can usually remember the difference between summer and winter weather, and in this case there is further supporting evidence. After his meeting with Himmler, Hoss later testified and wrote, he had to think over the most efficient method for disposing of Jews. Only later did an enterprising subordinate try an experiment with a commercial pesticide, Zyklon B, which was tested on some Soviet prisoners of war in an underground bunker. Those first killings by poison gas at Auschwitz, we know, occurred on 3 September 1941.43 Thus, Hoss's meeting with Himmler had to precede that date, occurring sometime during the summer. And, according to Mayer, if Hoss was the last to find out what was going to happen at Auschwitz, Himmler's plans were even earlier. None of Hoss's testimony fits Mayer's military timetable, and he does not discuss Hoss's account.

Mayer knows that just after Germany attacked the Soviet Union, mass killings of Jews began in Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine. He uses his previous analysis of hatred of Judeo-Bolshevism in these regions to account for "Savage pogroms immediately following the arrival of German troops " which were "the work of local vigilantes." In some cases, this description is no doubt true, but Mayer discounts the German role in events. He mentions that Franz Stahlecker, chief of Einsatzgruppe A, and Karl Jager, head of Einsatzkommando 3, both soon took credit for persuading or inciting the pogroms in their jurisdictions; he also quotes Field Marshal von Leeb, who blamed the German police authorities. Then he proceeds to dismiss this evidence: 'Whatever the license offered by the Wehrmacht and the encouragement given by the SS, the assaults on the Jews in and around Kovno, as well as those in Vilna, were essentially wild pogroms perpetrated by self-styled Lithuanian 'freedom fighters'." They were supposedly more a resumption of the post-World War I pogroms than a first step toward the liquidation of European Jewry.44

This improbable interpretation overlooks the fact that Heydrich had directed the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos to initiate pogroms.45 Moreover, Jager's summary report from December 1941 lists almost daily executions of hundreds, sometimes thousands of Jews in the forts outside Kovno from July 1941 on.46 Another article by me in this volume describes how a Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft Battalion, operating under the command of a German Reserve Police Battalion, carried out tens of thousands of executions in Byelorussia during fall 1941.47 Were these all just pogroms by Lithuanian freedom fighters?

One would never know from reading this book that on 23 June 1941, the day after the invasion of the Soviet Union began, Stahlecker told German policemen in Tilsit that their task was to subject nearby Lithuanian Jews and suspected Communists to "special treatment," which they proceeded to do. One does not learn here that on 28 July Himmler issued a written order to shoot all "racially inferior and criminal elements" in the marsh areas.48 Nazis employed both labels as standard descriptions for Jews.

Mayer could have mentioned any number of mass executions of many thousands of Jews in the Soviet territories by the Einsatzgruppen, German police battalions, and special Waffen-SS units during June, July, and August 1941 -thus before even the earliest conceivable date for military frustration. He mentions only the execution of 2,000 Jews in Bialystok on 27 June 1941.49 (There were actually two mass liquidations in Bialystok, probably in early July).50 Admitting that his example does not support his general argument, he asks: "What accounts for this premonitory wholesale murder of Jews in Bialystok at purely German hands?" The book does not provide an answer.

In his prologue Mayer explains that historians are expected to "invite critics, both friendly and hostile, to verify the authenticity and reliability of their evidence as well as to debate the logic of their constructions."51 Nonetheless, Mayer makes this commendable invitation difficult, if not impossible, for others to accept. Since there are no footnotes in this book whatsoever - not even for direct quotations - it is impossible to verify the authenticity and reliability of his evidence. And sometimes Mayer presents no evidence and no real supporting argument-just assertion. For example, he states that at Auschwitz and Maidanek the idea of gassing Jews and Gypsies developed only gradually or that large numbers of the 42,000 French Jews deported to Auschwitz during 1942 probably died a natural death from typhus.52

This book has a fairly substantial bibliography of secondary sources, but there is no clear indication that Mayer has examined unpublished archival sources. In various settings, Mayer has been criticized for his lack of source references. On one occasion when I happened to be present in the audience, he described the constant use of footnotes by historians as a kind of fetishism. He stated that he had written books with footnotes before; he no longer had any need to "prove his manhood."53

The author and the publisher have not done themselves a service by releasing this book in its present form.


1. Mayer, pp. vii, 16.

2. Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven, 1959); Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York, 1967); Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870-1956: An Analytic Framework (New York, 1971); and The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (New York, 1981).

3. Mayer, esp. pp. 19-35.

4. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

5. Ibid., p. 30.

6. Ibid., p. 5.

7. Ibid., pp. 47-55.

8. Ibid., pp. 77-78.

9. Ibid., pp. 5, 40.

10. Ibid., pp. 92-96.

11. Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill, 1983), esp. pp. 264-65.

12. Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-1945 (Cambridge, MA, 1983), esp. pp. 154-55.

13. Mayer, pp. 113, 159, 203.

14. Ibid., p. 113.

15. Ibid., p. 387.

16. Ibid., p. 10.

17. Ibid., p. 122.

18. Ibid., pp. 132, 147, 151, 333, 388.

19. Ibid., p. 154.

20. Ibid., p. 170.

21. Hans Buchheim and others, Anatomie des SS-Staates, 2 vols. (Munich, 1967), 1: 51-55; 2: 38-41.

22. Mayer, p. 180.

23. Hitler actually gave two speeches at Berchtesgaden that day.

24. A high-ranking officer present at Berchtesgaden took notes and turned them over to the anti-Nazi resistance, which, in turn, sought out Louis P. Lochner, the well-known correspondent for the Associated Press, and gave him a summary. Lochner showed it to an American diplomat, who was too terrified to hold onto it, so Lochner turned the document over to the British Councillor of Embassy in Berlin, 0gilvie-Forbes, who sent it posthaste to London. After 1945 other records of Hitler's remarks on 22 August appeared, which diverged somewhat from Lochner's document; they were less vivid and in some ways less extreme. The other, more official versions are in International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 42 vols. (Nuremberg, 1949), 26:338-44 (PS- 798) and 26:523-24 (PS-1014). See Winfried Baumgart, "Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Fuhrern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939: Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung," Vierte1jahrshefteffir Zeitgeschichte 16 (1968): 120-29; and Klaus-Jurgen Miiller, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime, 1933-1940 (Stuttgart, 1969), pp. 409-13. These scholars have argued that Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, chief of the Abwehr, German Military Intelligence, took the notes, and Hans Oster, Canaris's fiercely anti-Nazi deputy, edited the notes and arranged for them to reach the West through General Ludwig Beck, former Socialist Youth leader Hermann Maass, and Lochner.

For Lochner's version, see Louis P. Lochner, What About Germany? (New York, 1942), pp. 1-5; and Documents on British Foreign Policy, Vol. 7, No. 314, pp. 257-60. The Lochner report appears in the Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminals, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 8 vols. and 2 suppl. (Washington, 1946), 7:752-54 (L-003).

25. Charles W. Sydnor, Jr., Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death's Head Division, 1933-1945 (Princeton, 1977), p. 35.

26. Mayer, pp. 427, 185.

27. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, rev. ed., 3 vols. (New York, 1985), 1:193-95.

28. Mayer, p. 335.

29. Ibid., pp. 160-61, 165.

30. Herbert A. Strauss, "Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses," Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 25 (1980): 313-61 (Part 1); ibid. 26 (1981): 343-409 (Part 2).

31. Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945 (Bloomington, 1988), pp. 11-51; and David S. Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941 (Amherst, 1968).

32. Mayer, pp. 107-8.

33. Ibid., p. 201.

34. Ibid., pp. 113, 159-160, 163.

35. Ibid., p. 5.

36. Ibid., pp. 12, 31, 34, 235, 237, 248, 381.

37. See Christopher R. Browning, Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the "Final Solution" (New York, 1986), pp. 29-32, and my own forthcoming The Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the "Final Solution" (New York: Knopf, 1991), chap. 9.

38. Mayer, pp. 34, 235, 246-48, 279-80.

39. See Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East (Washington, 1987), p. 119. According to Ziemke and Bauer, Hitler wrote to the army commanders on 1 Jan. 1942 that holding firm against the Russian counteroffensive, which was using the last Soviet resources, would assure the final victory in the summer of 1942.

40. Mayer, pp. 240-41, 267-68, 298, 416.

41. Ibid., P. 364.

42. Rudolf Hoess [Hoss], Commandant of Auschwitz, trans. from the German (New York, 1961), p. 173; also Trial of Major War Criminals, 11: 398. For a shorter, but entirely consistent version, see Hoss's private conversation with Nuremberg psychologist Gilbert, in G. M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York, 1947), pp. 149-50.

43. Hoss, Commandant of Auschwitz, p. 175; Washington, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 238, Microfilm Publication M-1019, roll 28, frame 63: interrogation of Hoss, 14 May 1946.

44. Mayer, pp. 257, 259-60.

45. See Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 1938-1942 (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 150-53, for an extensive discussion of Heydrich's telegram of 2 July 1941 to the Einsatzgruppen chiefs.

46. Jager's Report of 1 Dec. 1941, pub. in facsimile in Adalbert Rilckerl, ed., NS- Prozesse (Karlsruhe, 1971), nonpaginated appendix.

47. See "Himmler's Police Auxiliaries in the Occupied Soviet Territories," pp. 23-39 of this volume.

48. Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher Strafiirteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tdtungsverbrechen, 1945-1966, 22 vols. (Amsterdam, 1979), 20: 304-5.

49. For other early executions, see esp. Yehoshua 130chler, "Kommandostab Reichsfiihrer SS: Himmler's Personal Murder Brigades in 1941," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 1 (1986): 11-21. See Mayer, p. 265, for his reference to 2,000 Jews in Bialystok.

50. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, p. 180.

51. Mayer, p. 17.

52. Ibid., pp. 362, 374.

53. "War die Endl6sung ein Kreuzzug?" Panel discussion, Munich, Am Gasteig, 17 Oct. 1989. Mayer used the English phrase "prove my manhood."

Chap 11

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