British Policy Toward East European Refugees in Germany and Austria, 1945-1947
by Arieh J. Kochavi
In the years immediately following World War II, Britain confronted the problem of an enormous concentration of refugees and displaced persons (DPs), most of them from Eastern Europe, who had gathered in the British occupation zones in Germany and Austria. At the end of September 1945, following the mass repatriations in spring and summer of that year, approximately 650,000 DPs still remained in the British zone in Germany, and about 60,000 in the British zone in Austria.1 Quite apart from their efforts to reduce the number of DPs then residing in these regions by repatriation, British authorities also had to contend with the infiltration of nationals from Eastern Europe, primarily from Poland and Yugoslavia, who were fleeing from their home countries in consequence of the Communist takeovers and hard economic conditions in that part of the world.2
Among the refugees fleeing to the West from Soviet-dominated countries, there were about 250,000 Jews, the great majority from Poland. Most of this exodus took place until the winter of 1946-1947. A substantial number of the Jews among these refugees had returned to Poland from the Soviet Union in winter and spring of 1946 under the terms of the repatriation agreements between the two countries.3 The flight of Jews from Eastern Europe greatly distressed the British because of the implications for the Palestine question. This article will examine the formation of British policy toward those East European Jewish refugees seeking to enter the British zones of occupation in Germany and Austria.
The initial reports from British occupation authorities concerning the arrival of thousands of Jewish refugees from Poland and Hungary in the British occupation zones were received in London late in 1945. At that time, there was no established government policy for dealing with such refugees. At the end of November 1945, the British Control Commission in Austria, which was responsible for administering the British zone in that country, estimated that about 7,000 Jews had infiltrated into the British zones since August 1945. It was the commission's view that these people should not be regarded as displaced persons since they had not been driven from their homes either as a result of war or because of persecutions by the Germans and their allies. Moreover, it was stressed that the Jewish refugees were open about their intention to make a nuisance of themselves until they were allowed to immigrate to Palestine. Nevertheless, the commission decided that it should permit these refugees to take up residence in DP camps and receive the same treatment as DPs of Allied countries.4
British officials in the British sector of Berlin, on the other hand, refused to provide food and shelter to Jewish refugees who had entered illegally, nor would they permit the Jews to enter the British occupation zone in Germany. The British representative in the Directorate of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons of the Allied Control Council, who had rejected an American request in December 1945 to accept Jewish refugees arriving from Eastern Europe, pointed out that his government considered them to be Polish nationals who ought to be returned to their country of origin. For its part, the British Control Commission in Germany (which was the organization responsible for administering the British zone in that country)5 advised London to consider whether this should be British policy, in view of the fact that the occupation authorities of the United States, France, and the Soviet Union were all granting asylum to these same refugees, and because of the criticism that a policy of this kind was likely to inspire in the press internationally, particularly in the United States.6
There was general agreement at the Refugee Department of the Foreign Office that the Jewish exodus from Poland was part of a Zionist scheme to make difficulties for British military authorities in Germany and Austria in order to demonstrate to the world that Jews were unable to live in Europe and therefore had no choice but to immigrate to Palestine. This view prevailed, notwithstanding the opinion of the British embassy in Warsaw that "most of the movement is spontaneous and is due to the fact that twenty-five million Poles dislike Jews."7 However, opinion was divided in the department in regard to how best to deal with the situation. Thus, one of the officials in charge of dealing with refugees and DPs, Ian L. Henderson, believed that Britain could not put itself in "the invidious position of being the only ally to refuse admittance" to Jewish refugees coming from Eastern Europe.8 The contrary position was taken by Sir George Rendel, who was then Superintending Under-Secretary in charge of the Refugee Department and had served in the 1930s as head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. Rendel maintained that every effort had to be made to prevent Jews who were leaving Eastern Europe from entering the British zone. Otherwise, he argued:
We may be playing the Jewish game and facilitating a manoeuvre which is not only likely to cause us great political inconvenience and expense but is also likely to cause great suffering and hardship to the Jews themselves. If they are freely admitted into the British zone the effect will be to encourage other parties to come and our efforts to check the exodus will be defeated.9
Rendel thought that the Jewish infiltrators should not be granted DP status, along with the advantages that would accrue to them as a result. He was aware that Jews would greatly resent being kept together with German refugees, or Germans who had been expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and being accorded the same treatment as the nationals of the defeated enemy. Nevertheless, he believed that this might be the most effective deterrent to any further unauthorized movement by Jews. In Rendel's opinion, moreover, the Jews leaving Eastern Europe should not be gathered into separate camps, because such treatment would imply recognition of Jews as a separate nationality and thus acknowledge their right to immigrate to Palestine.
Rendel's views were accepted by London. 10 Accordingly, at a meeting of the Cabinet Overseas Reconstruction Committee 11 in late January 1946, it was decided that the Jewish refugees should be treated on the same basis as German refugees and provided with rations on a reduced scale from that received by the Germans. At the same session, Ernest Bevin, who was the chairman of the committee, expressed the opinion that Jews who were leaving Poland were being influenced by, as he put it, "political rather than racial motives" in their efforts to get to Palestine.12
British sensitivities concerning the movement of Jews from Poland to Germany and Austria were affected to a great extent by the investigations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine, which had been established on Bevin's initiative in November 1945. At the time, London was perturbed by criticism in the United States of the British government's rejection of Truman's request to allow 100,000 Jews to enter Palestine, and articles in the American press about the lamentable conditions in which Jewish DPs were living in the British zones of occupation. There was concern that if the American president's proposal were accepted, Britain's position both in the Middle East as a whole and in Palestine in particular would be seriously threatened because of the unmitigated opposition to the immigration of Jews to that country by the Arab states, as well as the local Arab population. Bevin, therefore, sought to involve the United States directly in efforts to find a solution to the Palestine problem by forming the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, and thereby bringing an end to American criticism of Britain in this regard.13
During the early months of 1946, the flow of Jews from Eastern Europe abated considerably, with the result that the issue of Jewish refugees faded from prominence. But the arrival of several hundred Jews from Hungary in the British zone in Austria at the end of March and beginning of April 1946 aroused British fears that this might mark the start of a fresh influx on a large scale. British authorities in Austria doubted if the new arrivals could be returned to Hungary without the use of force. Moreover, there was some concern about the response of the Soviets, through whose zone in Austria the returnees would have to be taken back. Opinion at the British Commission for Austria was that admitting the Jewish refugees into DP camps in the Austrian zone could only encourage the movement to continue; on the other hand, refusal to let them into the camps would cause the Jews to become a burden on the Austrian state and a potential menace to security. The second alternative was regarded as preferable by the local British authorities.14 This position was, however, rejected by the British Control Office for Germany and Austria15 on the grounds that a move of this kind might be interpreted as favoring German over Jewish refugees in Austrian camps under British military administration.16
The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry investigated, inter alia, the Jewish exodus from Eastern Europe and estimated in its report of 20 April 1946 that as many as 200,000 Jews could be expected to leave Poland. The committee also concluded that no organization was deliberately facilitating the emigration. The report conceded, however, that "it seems probable that a kind of 'grape vine' or underground system has come into existence whereby the emigrating Jew is passed from hand to hand on the way out."17
Two courses of action were put before the British Control Office for Germany and Austria during May 1946 concerning the increased movement of Jewish refugees from the East. One proposal resulted from interdepartmental consultations headed by the Director of Military Operations at the War Office, Major General C. S. Sugden. This plan called for the registration of all Jews residing in the British zones in Germany and Austria, whether they were living in the camps or outside them. The proposal was firmly rejected by the Control Office, which explained:
The use of German and Austrian civil authorities to carry out a special registration of Jews for an object detrimental to their interests would immediately recall the Nuremberg laws and raise a howl of protest.18
In addition, the Control Office in London was opposed to the forcible return of Eastern European Jewish refugees to the countries from which they came, so that the registration measure would have no deterrent value. However, officials from the Control Office did believe that the decision to bar further entry of refugees to the DP camps in the British zone in Germany, beginning 1 July 1946, would end Jewish infiltrations, which could turn the camps into a springboard for reaching Palestine.19 An entirely different course of action was recommended by Robert B. Solomon, the British adviser for Jewish affairs in Germany.20 Solomon argued that a solution to the problem of the 16,000 Jewish DPs living in the British zone in Germany would make it possible to shut down the camps where they were housed -especially the Bergen-Belsen camp, home to most of the refugees and an objective for new Jewish refugees. Solomon believed that the British zone would cease to be attractive to Jews coming from Eastern Europe once these camps were closed. His plan included the settlement in Germany of 5,000 German Jews and the emigration of a portion of the Jewish DPs to other countries. The success of the scheme depended on the issuance of 8,000 certificates of immigration to Palestine.21
Solomon's plan received the support of John B. Hynd, Labor M.P. for Sheffield and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who headed the Control Office for Germany and Austria. Hynd was at that time under considerable pressure from Jewish organizations and Jewish public figures in Britain, and was eager to be rid of the problem of Jewish DPs who, although relatively small in numbers, were causing great difficulties. However, the issuance of the certificates of immigration required by Solomon's plan came under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office, which insisted that immigration policy should remain unchanged while talks were taking place with the Americans on the Anglo-American Committee's report. The immigration quota for Palestine at the time consisted of 1,500 certificates, of which a great number were allocated to illegal immigrants who had been caught by Mandate authorities while trying to enter Palestine by sea and were being held at detention camps. In the end, however, the failure of the negotiations with the United States and a substantial increase in illegal embarkations to Palestine ended any hope that Solomon's plan might be implemented.22
London's fears that improved weather would bring with it a renewed Jewish influx from Eastern Europe, especially from Poland, were borne out. About 30,000 Jews left Poland during June and July 1946.23 However, only a small number of these refugees sought to enter the British zone in Germany; the overwhelming majority made their way to the American zones of occupation, where they were accorded the status and full rights of displaced persons. But in the beginning of August 1946, it was reported that 2,000 Jews had got into Bergen-Belsen. The British Control Commission in Germany decided to make no attempt to expel the newcomers by force, although such action could be justified on the grounds that they were non-Germans who had entered the British zone illegally. The commission was anxious lest the incidents that might arise as a result "would be given great publicity and would be regarded as anti-Jewish policy." Additionally, it was noted that "after removing them [the Jewish newcomers] by force we could only stop them returning if we interned them or placed them in German prisons."24 Nonetheless, in order to deter potential infiltrators, a decision was made to withhold food supplies from refugees who had already taken up unauthorized residence at Bergen- Belsen.
The Control Office in London maintained that the approach which was being recommended by the British Control Commission in Germany was too moderate and would encourage more Jews to attempt to slip into the British zone. Such a policy could well undermine the intensive diplomatic efforts then being made by the Foreign Office to persuade the countries that were assisting the illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine to refrain from doing so. Withholding food rations would not deter the movement, since the problem of food could be dealt with by the Jews through assistance from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and from Jewish welfare organizations. The British Control Commission in Germany was, therefore, advised to prevent the further entry of Jews into Bergen-Belsen and to consider the possibility of removing those who had already entered the camp illegally, and dispersing them in Germany or returning them to the countries from which they came.25
During this period, London also stepped up efforts to halt illegal embarkations for Palestine. For instance, on 7 August 1946 the British cabinet decided to expel the illegal immigrants who had been seized on the coast of Palestine and to intern them in Cyprus. Prior to this date, the practice had been to detain such immigrants in Palestine and release them; permission for them to remain in the country was then debited against the immigration quota.26
The Commissions for both Germany and Austria were far from confident of their ability to cope with a mass influx of Jews. The British Control Commission in Germany noted that the Jewish refugees would experience no difficulty in entering the British occupation zone from the American and Soviet zones; and the British Control Commission in Austria pointed out that the Soviets were allowing Jews coming from Eastern Europe to enter the country, and that the Americans were assisting the movement. Both Control Commissions were, moreover, keenly aware of the obstacles that lay in the way of expelling the refugees to the countries from which they had come. The Commission for Austria doubted if a mass movement could be stopped by force. Reservations were expressed about the feasibility of employing arms for such a purpose "because of the effect on our troops who would be required to use them and from a political point of view."27
The opinion of the Control Office in London notwithstanding, the policies of denying entry to the camps to refugees and of withholding food rations from unauthorized residents at Bergen-Belsen proved to be efficacious. The later measure was the cause of considerable hardship for the population of the Bergen-Belsen camp, which had been attracting most of the Jewish refugees making their way into the British zone in Germany. In order to maintain the new arrivals, the Jewish Committee at the camp was compelled to draw on the limited resources furnished by Jewish welfare organizations. On 23 August 1946, Josef Rosensaft, the camp committee chairman, appealed to the Secretary General of UNRIZA, Fiorello La Guardia, to intervene. Rosensaft complained bitterly about the treatment being meted out to recently arrived Jewish refugees from Poland and observed: "It is tragic to see the spectacle of hundreds of these people who have undergone so many hardships as Jews, arrive in the British zone to be treated as German refugees."28
Some days earlier La Guardia had responded to the British government's statement that Jews arriving from Poland were ineligible for UNRRA assistance by declaring that the organization would continue to help them unless the UNIZAA Central Committee expressly ordered otherwise. He noted that, according to conservative estimates, between 60 and 70 thousand Jews would flee from Poland; and that UNRRA, in its capacity as a humanitarian organization, could not ignore the problem.29 At a meeting with Clement Attlee early in September 1946, La Guardia asked that Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe be allowed into the British zones and receive the same treatment as that extended to displaced persons. The British prime minister refused, adding that he did not believe that Jews were unable to go on living in Poland. Further, if conditions for these refugees were improved at the camps, the influx of Eastern European Jews would only increase. Indeed the entire movement, Attlee maintained, was artificial and was engineered primarily for the purpose of forcing his government's hand in the matter of Palestine.30
Some two months earlier there had been a pogrom in the Polish town of Kielce during which 47 Jews had been murdered, out of a total of 250 who had settled there after the war. Officials at the British embassy in Warsaw considered the situation of Jews in Poland intolerable and believed that the Kielce pogrom had persuaded Jews who had until then been hesitant about leaving to flee the country. In the event, about 35,000 Jews left Poland during the month of August 1946. However, the embassy's view was not accepted in London.31
In December 1946 the British Control Commission in Germany denied the truth of reports that the refusal of British authorities to give food rations to Jews living illegally at Bergen-Belsen was causing starvation in the camp. In issuing the denial, the commission proclaimed:
They are not starving to death but they may be short of food. No official rations are drawn for them but they are fed by other D.P.'s ration cards and from various other sources, including black market.32
The British Control Commission estimated that 3,000 Jews who were not DPs were living illegally at the camp. It was pointed out by the commission that these people had been informed, by loudspeaker and printed notices, that they would receive rations equal to that of Germans only if they left the camps to live among the local German population. The commission also claimed that although it had placed transport vehicles at the disposal of Jews in this category, none of them had come forward to take advantage of the service.
The representatives of Jewish organizations were unable to persuade British authorities to change their policy in the matter.33 In an effort to break the impasse, Josef Rosensaft suggested that the 1,868 unauthorized Jewish refugees who, he claimed, still remained in the camp be given the same rations as those allotted to Germans, without requiring them to leave Bergen-Belsen. They should be treated for all purposes as refugees for whom the German people were responsible. Rosensaft emphasized that most of these refugees were elderly and ill, and that the remainder consisted of families in which the women were pregnant or there were children at the camp schools. He also gave to the British his assurances that he would continue in his efforts to convince the unauthorized residents in the camp to move to the areas to which they had been assigned; concurrently he would work to prevent any increase in the number of unauthorized refugees entering the camp.34
The Control Office in London was favorably disposed to Rosensaft's proposal. Hynd was concerned that the policy toward the refugees from Eastern Europe might seriously strain relations with the Jewish community in Britain. He also wanted to put an end to the frictions that had arisen with UNRRA in consequence of the organization's insistence that it should be allowed to supply the unauthorized refugees with food. In a memorandum to the Cabinet Overseas Reconstruction Committee, with whom the final decision in the matter rested, Hynd wrote:
This is not an agreeable policy to administer because many of the "infiltrees" can undoubtedly show that they suffered from persecution, and rightly or wrongly, they fear discrimination if injected into the German community.35
Hynd was, nonetheless, opposed to granting these refugees DP status. He observed that Bergen-Belsen had become a major staging area in the British zone in Germany for the illegal immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe to Palestine. Changing the policy that was in force, Hynd argued, would only encourage the movement and further postpone the prospect of resettling the Jewish DPs and closing the camp. Rosensaft's proposal, on the other hand, was acceptable to the British Control Commission in Germany, and Hynd recommended its adoption.36
Subsequently, when the Cabinet Overseas Reconstruction Committee met on 23 April 1947, with the prime minister in attendance, Rosensaft's offer was accepted, provided that the chairman of the Bergen-Belsen camp committee would also agree to prevent further entry of unauthorized refugees.37
However, the proposal of the London Control Office to grant the refugees from Eastern Europe the same rights as German Jews, so that they might be encouraged to settle in Germany, was unacceptable to the British military government on the grounds that such an inducement would tempt more non- German Jews to enter the British zone. This argument was rejected by the Control Office, which maintained that the offer of resettlement in Germany was unlikely to serve as a lure to Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe. Still, the opposition of local British authorities persuaded the Control Office to refrain from submitting the proposal to the Cabinet Overseas Reconstruction Committee.38 Even so, the exodus of East European Jews slowed considerably in the course of 1947. The majority of Jewish refugees, some 20,000 persons, left from Romania, by way of Hungary, for the Soviet zone in Austria, then on to the American zone and to Italy.39
British policy toward Jewish refugees entering the British zone clandestinely from Eastern Europe was influenced by that country's struggle with the Zionists over Palestine. The Jewish DPs furnished the Zionists with a powerful political and propaganda weapon against British efforts to prevent Jewish immigration to Palestine. In London it was evident that as the number of Jewish refugees grew in DP camps in Germany, Austria, and Italy, Britain would come under mounting pressure internationally, particularly from the United States' to open Palestine to Jewish immigration. The Jewish influx from Eastern Europe was creating an enormous pool of candidates for clandestine embarkations to the Middle East.
Strained relations between Britain and the Soviet bloc made it difficult to persuade local authorities to stop the departure and movement of Jews to the Western occupation zones in Germany and Austria. The British were, therefore, able to act against the movement only within the areas under their jurisdiction. British occupation authorities were, moreover, prevented from taking drastic action against Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe, such as forced repatriation, because of the operational difficulties involved and the worldwide criticism that such action was likely to arouse.
In any event, it would appear that even the restrained measures implemented by the British were of sufficient force to be effective. By the spring of 1947, there were approximately 153,000 Jews living in the American zone in Germany, whereas only about 14,000 resided in the British zone.40 The Americn policy of extending full DP status and privileges to all Jews fleeing Eastern Europe greately reduced the need for British measures in this regard since, as a result, most of the refugees preferred to find sanctuary in the American zone. Although Britain was relieved of the need to maintain many thousands of additional Jewish refugees in the regions that were under its occupation, there still remained the political problem posed by the presence of a very sizable concentration of displaced Jews in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Furthermore, American military authorities in Germany and Austria were seeking to reduce the number of Jewish DPs in their zones of occupation, and were accordingly helping those refugees to reach Italian and French ports, from which vessels carrying illegal immigrants set sail for the coast of Palestine.41
1. Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees, 1939-1952: A Study in Forced Population Movement (Evanston, 11, 1956), pp. 238-39.
2. Kew, United Kingdom, Public Record Office [hereafter cited as PRO], British Prime Minister correspondence and papers [hereafter cited as PREM] 8/522: memorandum for the Prime Minister, 8 Dec. 1946.
3. Yehuda Bauer, Flight and Rescue: Brichah (New York, 1970); Yisrael Gutman, The Jews in Poland After World War II (Jerusalem, 1985), pp. 20-59 [Hebrew]; Joseph B. Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955 (Philadelphia, 1962), chap. 8; Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted (New York and Oxford, 1985), pp. 331-39.
4. PRO, Foreign Office [hereafter cited as FOI 945/655: Acarbit Vienna [Allied Commission for Austria] to Troopers [War Office], 18 Oct. 1945; PRO, FO 945/599: Acarbit Vienna to War Office, 25 Nov. 1945.
5. The Allied Control Council in Germany was formally the supreme authority in matters affecting the country as a whole. The council was composed of the four commanders in chief of the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the French Republic. Each power held the chairmanship for a month in rotation. The decisions of the council had to be unanimous. Each of the powers had ultimate authority in its zone of occupation. The Allied Control Council had no authority over the British Control Commission. See Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria (London, New York, and Toronto, 1956), pp. 92-102, 312-17; Tony Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (Oxford, 1975), pp. 204-8; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945 (Washington, 1961), pp. 183-87.
6. PRO, FO 1005/838: note by the Secretariat, Directorate of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons, 7 Dec. 1945; PRO, FO 943/699: Bercomb [Control Commission for Germany, Berlin] to War Office, 8 Dec. 1947; New York, Yivo Archives, Leo W. Schwartz Papers [hereafter cited as Yivo, Schwartz Papers], 9/63: Philip Skorneck, American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC), Director for Berlin, to Captain Vleck, Welfare Section, Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany, 6 Dec. 1945.
7. PRO, FO 688/31, file no. 46: Robin M. A. Hankey, British embassy Warsaw, to Hilary Young, Political Division, Control Commission for Germany, 18 Dec. 1945.
8. PRO, FO 371/51128, WR3648: minutes by Henderson, 11 Dec. 1945.
9. PRO, FO 371/57684, WR93: Rendel to Lt. Col. V. M. Hammer, War Office, 9 Jan. 1946.
10. PRO, FO 371/57684, WR75: record of a meeting at Refugee Department, Foreign Office, 7 Jan. 1946.
11. The Cabinet Overseas Reconstruction Committee dealt with postwar reconstruction and food supply, as well as related foreign-policy issues. See Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951 (New York and London, 1983), pp. 33, 57.
12. PRO, FO 371/57686, WR267: Cabinet Overseas Reconstruction Commit- tee, O.R.C. (46) 2nd Meeting, 25 Jan. 1946; PRO, FO 371/57686, WR 267: Troopers to Bercomb, 28 Jan. 1946.
13. For more about the Anglo-American Committee, see Amikam Nachmani, Great Power Discord in Palestine: The Anglo-American Committee for Palestine (London, 1987); Michael J. Cohen, "The Genesis of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, November 1945: A Case Study in the Assertion of American Hegemony," Historical journal 22 (1979): 186-207; Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust (New York, 1982), pp. 11-99; William Roger Louis,The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1984), pp. 397-419.
14. PRO, FO 943/485: Acarbit Vienna to Troopers, 8 Apr. 1946.
15. The British Control Office for Germany and Austria in London was responsible for the administration of the British zones of occupation. The Control Office was transferred from the War Office in October 1945 and placed under the supervision of John B. Hynd. The Control Office operated through the British Control Commissions in Germany and Austria. See Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 147; Balfour and Mair, Four-Power Control, pp. 99-100.
16. PRO, FO 945/372: memorandum by R. S. Crawford, Permanent Secretary, Control Office, 6 May 1946; PRO, FO 945/590: Troopers to Acarbit Vienna, 11 May 1946.
17. Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry Regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine (London: HMSO, 20 Apr. 1946), Cmd. 6808, p. 52.
18. PRO, FO 371/57691, WR1336: Crawford to Douglas Macillop, Head of Refugee Department, Foreign Office, 20 May 1946; PRO, FO 371/52519, E3969: minutes of a meeting, 27 Apr. 1946; PRO, FO 945/381: R. 0. Wilberforce to Sugden, 11 June 1946.
19. PRO, FO 371/57693, WR2151: Wilberforce to Sugden, 2 Aug. 1946.
20. Colonel Robert B. Solomon was formerly chairman of the Jewish National Fund in Britain and was appointed by Hynd in April 1946 to the post of adviser for Jewish affairs in Germany. See Norman Bentwich, They Found Refuge (London, 1956), pp. 95-96, 143-44.
21. PRO, FO 945/384: "Notes on a Proposal for the Resettlement of Jews at Present Residing with the British Zone, Germany," 8 May 1946.
22. PRO, FO 371/52526, E4928: Crawford to Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Colonial Office, 26 May 1946; PRO, FO 945/378: Trafford Smith to Crawford, 19 June 1946; PRO, FO 945/384: Hynd to Arthur Creech-Jones, Secretary of State for Colonies, 15 Oct. 1946; PRO, FO 945/384: Creech- Jones to Hynd, 29 Oct. 1946. About the Anglo-American negotiations, see Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948 (Princeton, 1982), chap. 6; Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry, and Israel, 1945-1948 (New York and London, 1979), pp. 65-79.
23. Bauer, Flight and Rescue, pp. 211-12; Gutman, Jews in Poland, pp. 48-49. 24. PRO, FO 945/723: Bercomb to Confolk, 3 Aug. 1946.
25. PRO, FO 945/723: Confolk to Bercomb, 8 Aug. 1946. About UNRRA, see George Woodbridge, UNRRA, The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 3 vols. (New York, 1950); Proudfoot, European Refugees, pp. 98-106, 133-47, 230-302.
26. PRO, Cabinet 128/6: cabinet meeting, 7 Aug. 1946; David Schaary, The Cyprus Detention Camps for Jewish "Illegal" Immigrants to Palestine, 1946-1949 (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 45-51, 321-25 [Hebrew].
27. PRO, FO 943/543: Allied Commission for Austria to Control Office for Germany and Austria, 19 Aug. 1946; PRO, FO 945/372: Allied Commis- sion for Austria to Control Office for Germany and Austria, 31 Aug. 1946; PRO, FO 945/494: Control Commission for Germany, Berlin to Control Office for Germany and Austria, 31 Aug. 1946.
28. Jerusalem, Yad Vashem Archives, 0-70/6 (3/17): Josef Rosensaft to La Guardia, 23 Aug. 1946; Yivo, Schwartz Papers, 41/397: report on the activities of the AJDC in the British Zone, Germany, 20 Sept. 1946.
29. PRO, FO 371/57693, WR2199: News Chronicle, 14 Aug. 1946.
30. PRO, PREM 8/384: note of Mr. La Gauardia's interview with the Prime Minister, 5 Sept. 1946; PRO, PREM 8/384: memorandum for the Prime Minister, 4 Sept. 1946; PRO FO 371/57696: memorandum by Rendel, 2 Sept.1946.
31. PRO, FO 371/52630, E8422: John Russel to Charles Baxter, Head of Eastern Department, Foreign Office, 21 Aug. 1946; PRO, FO 371/57694, WR2287: Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, British ambassador in Poland, to Foreign Office, no. 1312, 25 Aug. 1946. About the pogrom in Kielce, see Bauer, Flight and Rescue, pp. 205-11; Michael Checinski, Poland (New York, 1982), pp. 21-34.
32. PRO, FO 945/723: Control Commission Lubbecke to Control Office London, 10 Dec. 1946; PRO, FO 945/723: Marcus Shloimovitz, Board of Deputies of British Jews, to Allied Control Commission for Germany, 5 Sept. 1946; PRO, FO 945/723: draft letter to Shloimovitz, 6 Sept. 1946.
33. PRO, FO 945/723: Hynd to A. C. Brotman, Board of Deputies of British Jews, 31 Dec. 1946; PRO, FO 945/384: minutes, "Jews in the British Zone of Germany," 21 Jan. 1947.
34. PRO, FO 945/723: Rosensaft to Solomon, 31 Jan. 1947.
35. PRO, FO 945/723: memorandum by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, O.R.C. (47) 23, 10 Apr. 1947; PRO, FO 945/723: Control Office to Berlin, 26 Feb. 1947.
36. PRO, FO 945/723: Berlin to Control Office, 12 Mar. 1947.
37. PRO, FO 945/467: Extract from the Conclusions of the 4th Meeting of the Cabinet Overseas Reconstruction Committee, 23 Apr. 1947; PRO, FO 945/723: Lemgo to Foreign Office (German Section), 9 May 1947; Yad Vashem Archives, 0-70/5 (7/18): brief notes of interview with Mr. Friedenberg, Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Division, 28 May 1947.
38. PRO, FO 945/380: Deputy Military Governor to Control Office for Germany and Austria, 26 Feb. 1947; PRO, FO 945/380: General Department, Control Office for Germany and Austria, to Office of the Deputy Military Governor, 13 Mar. 1947.
39. PRO, FO 371/61826, E8503: Lubbecke to Foreign Office (German Section), 12 Sept. 1947; Bauer, Flight and Rescue, pp. 297-304.
40. PRO, FO 3712/66673, WR3598: memorandum for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the refugee problem, 8 Oct. 1947; PRO, FO 945/384, brief for the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 23 Apr. 1947.
41. PRO, FO 371/57697, WR3138: Paris to Foreign Office, no. 537, 31 Oct. 1946; PRO, FO 371/52636, E11025: minutes by Beith, 4 Nov. 1946; PRO, FO 371/61811, E5176: memorandum from Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 Apr. 1947.