The Economics of the Final Solution: A Case Study from the General Government
Gotz Aly and Susanne Heim
Translated by Norma von Ragenfeld-Feldman.
On 31 July 1941 Hermann Goring commissioned Reinhard Heydrich to make the organizational preparations for the murder of the European Jews. Goring did this in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan,1 a position in which he had already successfully directed both Aryanization and forced emigration. He was also responsible for the economic rationalization and the increasingly more effective economic exploitation of the German Reich and the occupied territories. In this, he was advised by a committee of state secretaries and experts, who can be considered as the actual "crisis managers" of the Third Reich.
These experts did not primarily use an ideological approach, but one of pragmatic rationality. They constantly used such concepts as "solution" (Losung) or "total solution" (Gesamtlosung). They did not revel in myths of blood and race, but thought in categories of large-scale economic spaces, structural renewal, and overpopulation with its attendant food problems; and they were resolved to effectuate more rational methods of production, standardize products, and improve social structures. They always thought and acted at the expense of minorities, whose stigmatization and discrimination were prescribed by Nazi ideology. In this way, they attempted to secure advantages for the majority of the population, or at least guarantee its social status, by subjecting the minorities to extreme social disabilities that ultimately ended in death.
The policy of destruction in the Third Reich, it seems to us, must be understood as a systematic constituent of the social policy practiced at that time. In the context of our work on the murders committed against psychiatric patients, we have come across the connection between modernization and destruction. Thus in the "euthanasia operation," therapeutic progress and the advances made in the organization of traditional institutional psychiatry were explicitly intermingled with the killing of incurable patients who failed to respond to therapeutic treatment.22 We encountered the same relationship in our investigation of economic planning in occupied Poland. There the draft of an economic development program was linked to the increasingly outspoken demand that Jews be eliminated from the artificial creation known as the General Government.3
In line with our working hypothesis, we are not interested in the irrational and pathological personality traits of a few Nazi leaders, who seem to us far more intelligent and discerning than is generally assumed; rather, we are concerned with the many institutions of the regime involved with planning, the gathering of statistics, and statistical analysis.4 After 1938 these institutions became increasingly influential and counted such men as Fritz Todt, Albert Speer, Herbert Backe, and Reinhard Heydrich among their political representatives. They based their decisions on the work done at such research institutions as the German Labor Front Institute for the Scientific Study of Labor, the National Working Association for Spatial Research, certain departments of the SS Security Service (SD), the National Board for Economy and Efficiency, the Institute for German Projects in the East (Ostarbeit), the German Foreign Institute (Auslandsinstitut), as well as many others.
It is our hypothesis that between September 1939 and the summer of 1941, various groupings of Germany's educated elite involved with planning devised the "final solution" for logical reasons and implemented it in conjunction with the war against Russia. The "final solution" evolved from studies and proposals of subordinate planning officials, gradually moving from the lower to the higher bureaucratic echelons. It should be carefully noted that these planners, who did not always appear to be of importance within the hierarchy, did not themselves make the decisions but suggested them to superiors
The invasion of Poland confronted the Nazi planners with social problems they had not previously encountered in their own territorial sphere of domination. Nevertheless, the confrontation was not unexpected. Already during the 1930s, German social scientists from all disciplines had been concerned with the poverty, overpopulation, and structural underdevelopment in Eastern and Southeastern Europe; and professors such as Theodor Oberlander and Peter-Heinz Seraphim, Oberlander's former student, had acquired an exact overview of the situation from their social scientific outpost at Konigsberg.5 In 1935 Oberlander already stated:
The extraordinarily high agrarian density, combined with the lack of capital, creates especially for the zone adjacent to Russia the danger of heading, just as in Russia, toward a social upheaval arising from internal tensions and overpopulation pressures.6
The Nazi space and economic planners-and not they aloneviewed Poland as being overpopulated. Her economy suffered from too little labor productivity, that is, from a deficient labor organization and lack of capital. It was not by accident that the mixture of inefficiency, disorder, and poverty in Polish factories and farms was in Germany commonly referred to as "Polish conditions" (polnische Wirtschaft); and even today, in the jargon of German automobile workers, a nonstandardized machine screw is called a "Polish screw."
In order "to tie the eastern agrarian states to the Central European space"7 and subject them to the notion of the economy of large-scale spaces (Groftauntwirtschaft) under German hegemony, it was particularly important to solve the social question and break through this selfsatisfied underproductivity. Thus, if conditions in Poland, as measured by German notions of economic and political order, had already appeared untenable to the Germans long before their invasion, then the situation must have deteriorated considerably after the so-called incorporation of western Poland into the Reich. With the conquest of the western Polish provinces, Germany incorporated not only the most important industrial regions of Poland, but also those agricultural regions where the surplus that was produced provided the Polish population with food and kept the foreign trade balance on a somewhat even keel. By contrast, the "remainder of Poland" (Restpolen), organized as the General Government, was for the Germans "a creation with little economic prospect."
Originally Hitler had intended to leave the General Government to its own devices. In late autumn of 1939, the Germans regarded it as a "heap of rubble" and manpower reservoir. They began to dismantle its industrial plants and used this territory, reduced in size by the war and sandwiched between German and Soviet spheres of influence, as the region designated for dumping the unwanted and expropriated. The deportees were to vegetate there under the worst conditions and, if need be, die from tuberculosis, typhus, hunger, and deprivation. But when the German civilian government developed the ambition in March 1940 to create a "Germanic development program," every planning step amounted to an attempt to decrease the density of the population or, at least, prevent further population growth.8
The Germans could achieve this if they found a way to eliminate the sizeable Jewish minority from the total population. After all, they constituted a good 10 percent of the population, and often much more in the cities that were difficult to control and provision. The extreme poverty of most Polish Jews precluded from the outset the application of traditional Nazi anti-Jewish techniques and policies (judenpolitik), consisting of threats and expropriations forcing Jews to purchase their emigration at high prices. The so-called Eastern Jews (Ostjuden) thus represented a social "mass problem" whose "solution" would simultaneously make a large part of visible Polish poverty disappear. In November 1939 the Hamburg Wirtschaftsdienst published an article by Peter-Heinz Seraphim on "The Economic Significance of Polish Jews." Seraphim focused programmatically on the relationship between Jewish poverty and the social question:
In Poland, as in the entire East European area of habitation, the Jewish question definitely is a mass problem.... Particularly in Poland, we find a large group of destitute people, the so-called Jewish Luftmenschen, that is, a people who live off air, from hand to mouth, thoroughly proletarianized, for the most part a demoralized element that is mobile in location and occupation. Several factors have reenforced this process of impoverishment in the postwar period. If one is to make a rough estimate of the extent of the pauperization of the East European Jews of Poland and understands by the Jewish pauper a character who is unable to maintain himself on the basis of his own economic strength without charity and outside Jewish help or whose standard of living is considerably lower than that of small peasants and industrial workers, then one can regard approximately 35 percent of all Jews in Poland thus defined as pauperized.9
Moreover, the poverty of Polish Jews increased massively due to the war and the discrimination that immediately followed in its wake.
Even earlier, in December 1939, an official of the German Foreign Institute mentioned the connection between poverty and the desirability of destruction in a report about his trip through occupied Poland. This official, Dr. Eduard Konekamp, reported his observations on the first mass resettlements from the annexed western part of Poland to the eastern edge of the newly formed General Government:
Many Germans probably see Jews in such masses for the first time.... [The ghettos] are among the filthiest things imaginable. Here the Jews vegetate in quarters that are sometimes as much as four flights underground. The prevailing hygienic and moral conditions here are ghastly.
The kinds of "criminal Jewish types" milling about, his report continued, far surpassed the ones depicted by the Sturmer. But now "they are most vigorously enlisted to do labor, [and] those who do not appear for work are shot." The latter assertion, however, corresponded to Konekamp's imagined desires rather than the reality at the time.
Konekamp, who after World War II was appointed Deputy Mayor of Stuttgart by the Allies,10 described in his 1939 report what were no doubt common German reactions when confronted with the poverty, exacerbated by wartime, of the Polish-Jewish residential quarters:
The destruction of this sub-humanity (Untermenschentum) would serve the interests of the entire world. But this destruction poses an extraordinarily difficult problem. Executions will not work. Also, one cannot allow women and children to be shot. Here and there one can also count on the losses incurred during evacuations, and 450 are said to have perished during a transport of 1,000 Jews from Lublin.... All the agencies concerned with the Jewish question recognize the inadequacy of these measures. But a solution to this complicated problem has not yet been found.11
It took two more years until such visionary schemes of destruction, conceived by mid-level bureaucrats, were implemented. During this time German administrative practices produced conditions that made genocide appear reasonable and useful.
The scientists and experts who worked in the General Government and built their careers there were on the average quite young. Generally speaking, Germany probably never had a younger, more mentally agile, and more active administrative elite than during the Nazi period. Until the end of 1941, the power and influence of these 25- to 35-yearold managers grew as Germany expanded, enabling them to pay progressively less attention to obstinate realities while developing their plans. As Helmut Meinhold, one of the experts, wrote:
[In the General Government] the economic planner is confronted with a totally new situation. The issue is not the location of a new industrial plant or the most advantageous development of a transportation network under a given set of economic conditions. Rather, in the economic sphere one basically finds oneself close to a tabula rasa.12
It is self-evident that no such tabula rasa actually existed in the densely populated General Government. It first had to be created by the appropriate terrorist policies. And since the economic factors such as capital, energy, raw materials, or transport capacities could not be manipulated and were, quite simply, in ever shorter supply as the war progressed, the only remaining economic factor that planners of this ilk could actually modify was the number and composition of the population. In a study on the "Expansion of the General Government to the East," Meinhold, who was then 28 years old and after the war became one of the most important advisers on social policy in the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, focused exclusively on "migration" (Siedlungsbewegungen), which he regarded as an absolute prerequisite were every additional annexation "to be economically useful."13 Although Meinhold never contemplated the construction of a single railroad line, he did consider "removing part or all of the Poles" to the East in order to solve "the problem of overpopulation."14 The Jews, however, he wanted "resettled" in any case.
In the view of such planning officials, the General Government served as a colonial zone for experimentation with respect to racial ideology, vo1kisch politics, population policy, economics, or whatever else one wants to call it. Like every young and power-hungry elite, these men pressed forward when the opportunity arose; they were determined to implement their ideas. This opportunism also explains why after 1945 the same men (moved by both indignation and self-pity) with agility and little effort found their way into new positions after their "reeducation." Their basic rule for planning and implementing policies was to clear away everything considered to be a nuisance, including every unpopular minority and the Jews in any case. At this point, their planning concepts intersected with racial ideology. And from the amalgam of both elements, resulted the plans for and implementation of the destruction of millions of human beings.
Population as a Variable
The German spatial planners and economists considered "overpopulation" the main problem of the economic order in the General Government. This troublesome condition, however, was not caused by too high a population density per square mile. Overpopulation was-and always is-defined relatively and is proportionate to insufficient productivity and underemployment, that is, to the inadequate utilization of the available labor force. Moreover, the additional factor of "mentality" explained why the labor force in the General Government was "less efficient than the German one" since it "generally lacked what was natural to the German worker, namely the motivation to organize his own work with the purpose of attaining the highest labor efficiency possible ... [and also lacked] the impulse to reach a higher standard of living by increased productivity."15
From this perspective, "every other person in Polish agriculture" represented "nothing more than dead ballast."16 In economic terms, it was the system of self-contained home industries that determined the unprofitable conditions in the Polish villages. Money hardly played a role at all in the system. The rural population produced not only foodstuffs but practically all basic commodities; at most, they engaged in a kind of barter trade with other home industries located in the village or surrounding region, so that in the view of the economic planner Helmut Meinhold, who worked at the Institute for German Projects in the East in Cracow, "there basically existed no economy in the actual sense of the term."17
Concepts such as "marketing," "market control," or "development" made the self-sufficient conditions of life in the Polish villages appear absurd. The self-contained home industries were an economic factor that could not be moved at will, but rather a barrier to the plans of economic planners, population policy makers, and SS officers. Not only did the villages provide the social backing for the resistance-how else could both hunted partisans and those who had evaded forced labor exist? - but they also assured the survival of the rural population itself. Given the system of subsistence economy, the occupation forces, determined to cart agricultural products off to Germany, could enforce the steadily increasing delivery quotas only with difficulty, even after the hunger of the Polish population had already been calculated as part of the quotas. It was impossible to draw profits from this economy. Furthermore, it resisted every kind of rationalization. On the one hand, unemployment did not for the most part manifest itself openly; and on the other hand, a natural economy made the accumulation of capital as a prerequisite for investments for the purpose of raising the productivity level virtually impossible.18
According to such analyses, the agrarian overpopulation not only spelled disaster for agriculture itself, but gradually also affected an increasing number of other economic sectors. A natural produce economy and barter trade (that is, production for the local and, at best, regional markets) resulted in only small surpluses in agriculture-related trade and industry (partly also in home industries as, for example, blacksmithing and cart making) and also in extremely low labor productivity. To rationalize these not easily transparent relationships within the self-sufficient economies of the Polish households, villages, and districts, Meinhold was not satisfied with just describing the phenomena of overpopulation and the "low labor return"; he also postulated the mathematical relationship of the two factors to each other. He adopted from Oberlander the so-called Mombertian Formula,19 which reads as follows:
The space available for food (Nahrungsraum, or N) equals the size of the population (Volkszahl, or V) times the cost of living (Lebenshaltung, or L).
In abbreviated form: N = V x L.
The actual function of this formula lies in it being abstracted from its substantive content and thereby suggests the possibility that individual factors can be manipulated with and written, for example, as:
(Population size equals the space available for food divided by the cost of living.) But if the space for food was limited and the cost of living had already been reduced to a subsistence level, then the thing to do would be to reduce the size of the population (V). Thus expressed in manageable terms, population size became a magnitude that was, alongside others, variable at will. Mass murder, forced resettlements invasions of other countries, or the deliberate policy of starvation were equated with "reduction of the size of the population," "expansion of nutritional space," or "reduction of living costs"; and thus metamorphosed into sanitized scientific terms, they became part of the repertory of economic planning.
A less aggressive possibility of expanding the space for food lay in increasing the yield per hectare of land, but Meinhold dismissed this as an alternative, since it did not provide new work opportunities to alleviate the agrarian overpopulation. As he concluded, "Thus the only possibilities left are the reduction of the size of the population or the extension of the space allotted to food production to non-agrarian sectors."20
Without intervention from the outside, however, the demographic conditions in the General Government would constantly deteriorate due to the excess of births over deaths by about 140,000 people per year and the deportations from the annexed western provinces of Poland: "Indeed, one can even foresee the time when the rural population will sink below the subsistence level, although by German standards it has been below the minimum of economic subsistence for several decades." This did not necessarily upset the German intellectuals in Cracow. What it did mean to them, however, was "that the region ... becomes a burden on the rest of the grand region (Grobraum), and therewith practically on the Reich itself, at least as far as covering the costs of administration, transport, and economic organization are concerned."21
In his calculations, Meinhold also used the "greatest possible labor productivity in the grand region" as a yardstick to apply to the General Government. According to this criterion, he ascertained the "size of the labor force ... that would be needed if agricultural labor were organized correctly" and compared "this size ... to the size of the labor force actually available."22
Thus, a country was ultimately considered overpopulated to the degree its labor productivity lagged behind the greatest possible labor productivity within the "European grand region." Therefore, a subsistence economy that hardly produced surpluses had automatically to be considered overpopulated if measured against such thoroughly capitalized states as the German Reich, no matter how many people lived in it. Finally, Meinhold calculated the effect of two variants (the same organization of labor as in the Reich, or a somewhat less favorable one) and arrived at a surplus population amounting to 4.~ million or 5.83 million people, that is, roughly 30 percent of the total population of the General Government.23
Once a beginning had thus been made, the entire project assumed gigantic proportions, which did not remain limited to the General Government. In Southeastern Europe, "in the case of a radical solution of the agrarian labor problem," a decision to use migratory labor meant that "12 to 15 million workers ... [would be] set into motion." And that was not all, since these workers also had families so that "a rough total of 50 million people would have emerged out of their hitherto virtually self-contained home economies and, in accordance with this, market relations too would experience major changes.... It is a task fit for the notion of the grand region and a basis for the ideological justification of the grand region as a concept."24 The "ideological justification of the concept," however, had a material side to it. Since previously "the market in the whole overpopulated zone is not worth much despite the large number of over one hundred million inhabitants," favorable market conditions would first have to be created by a restructuring process. "It is therefore quite certain with respect to the eastern and southeastern territories that the reorganization, even if it occurs in conjunction with industrialization, can only expand the market for German industry.25
Meinhold's planning led to an obvious conflict of goals. The released labor force, amounting to millions of workers in the occupied European countries, would try to find both work and bread, while migrating from east to west. An even greater "population pressure" would result for the eastern districts of the Reich, and the Germanization projects would simply be undermined by economic mechanisms, threatening the social stability of the grand region. This would have to be counteracted "through the following measures ... implemented either singly or in concert":
(1) Labor in the Reich, especially migratory labor, will be regulated by law in such a way that it will represent no threat, in terms of its nature and extent, to the German national terrain.
In conquered Poland, the number of industrial jobs had declined under German domination.27 Meinhold knew this; he was well informed about current statistics. Thus his proposal "to reduce the density of the population in the General Government," which he thought appropriate in addition to labor deportations, gained in importance.
(2) The number of available jobs in the General Government will be increased as much as possible.
(3) The population density in the General Government will be reduced.
(4) The extent and pace of the economic use of the organization of labor in the General Government will be adjusted as far as possible to the other three measures as they become effective.26
Finally, Meinhold concluded that "above all, the possibility [should be] mentioned ... that by settling the Jewish question a number of jobs will become available and, at the same time, a reduction-albeit not a sufficiently large one-of the size of the population will occur." Thus, "considerable relief for the strained labor market ... could temporarily alleviate the situation in the General Government."28
For this, however, speed was required, as Meinhold's assistant, Hans Kraft Normenmacher, noted:
As overpopulation increases, the chances of eliminating overpopulation decreases, and the results will contribute to still more overpopulation. For with constantly diminishing labor productivity, the population is no longer capable of saving the capital necessary to heighten the efficiency of the factories. But this heightened efficiency, in turn, is the precondition for creating new employment opportunities, in agriculture as well as in industry which, if savings were accumulated at a higher rate, would gradually rebuild itself. Here we see ourselves confronted by a vicious circle, which steadily leads to the growing pauperization (Verelendung) of the population. The manifestations and further consequences resulting from this condition are manifold.29
This notion did not imply that the "excess" population would just be killed. After all, that did not happen. The destruction of part of the population through hunger and deportation was a means to break through the diagnosed vicious circle of underproductivity, that is, to force an opening into the self- contained economic system and thereby create the prerequisites for rationalizing the entire economy as well as the productive utilization of the rest of the population.
Evidently, these theories also achieved popularity in the planning staffs of German firms. In 1942, the economic department of IG Farben considered the massacres of several hundred thousands of Serbs by the Croatian Ustasha as a constructive contribution to the solution of the overpopulation problem in the Balkans.30 In the camouflaged language of the times, a report about the economic structure of Croatia stated:
Furthermore, in connection with the removal of numerous Serbian peasants, it is hoped that the problem of the large agrarian overpopulation of particular regions-for example, Zagoria, Dalmatia, and the Lika-will be solved by a generous internal colonization. At the same time, the crop yield per hectare, still far below the European average, is to be increased by a more intense cultivation of the land.31
The Transformation of Racial Science into Sociology
To segregate the Jews according to plan, the General Government's ministry of interior, known as the Central Office (Hauptabteilung) for Internal Administration, set up from the beginning a special office and assigned it a name with many facets: Office for Population Policy and Welfare (Abteilung Bevolkerungswesen und Farsorge). The significance of this office for the destruction of the Jews living in the General Government has hardly been examined thus far; that is, its assessment in the literature is flawed.32 The office was first directed by Dr. Fritz Arlt, a member of the SS Security Service. A student of Arnold Gehlen, Arlt was a theologian, sociologist, and population specialist, who had gathered relevant experiences in Silesia and Leipzig in connection with his bureaucratic activity of sorting out minorities, in particular Jews.33 In his first progress report of May 1940, he provided the following summary: Among the most necessary instruments of a German National Socialist administration over alien peoples (fremdvolkische) is an official agency that is specifically concerned with the ethno-political (volkspolitische) structure of the region, because ethno-political knowledge of all kinds-national, racial, statistical, historical, and so on-is basic for every practical administrative task, ranging from the calculation of the expected tax revenues to the distribution of the police force.34
Such a comprehensive task required experts who were qualified and interested; Arlt as well as his successor Lothar Weirauch fulfilled such requirements. Both were not only convinced race researchers, who as members of the master race made no secret of their arrogance toward Poles and Jews, but also clear-thinking social planners and demographers. The most pressing task of the office was the racial assessment of people and their division into different ethnic groups. The divisions not only were expressed in statistical terms; they also determined the sum total of the material conditions of life. Hence, alongside the desks for social welfare, state welfare, resettlement, statistics, and the procurement of lineage certificates (Sippenamt), there were, respectively, special desks for Ukranians, Jews, Poles, and ethnic Germans. As was stated, "each individual ethnic group will be handled by a special desk (Referat)."35 And the tie to welfare was said to be necessary "in order to influence indirectly the ethnic policy (volkspolitische) situation."36
This was thus a graduated system, sometimes positive and sometimes negative, of social services and discriminations, ranging from food allocations for resettled ethnic Germans to compulsory labor for Jews. Later on, the Office for Population Policy and Welfare coordinated and directed Vederfuhrend) ghettoization and the deportations, with the SS and police providing official assistance (Amtshilfe).37 Weirauch, who after the war described his work as having been purely charitable and received from former co-workers written confirmation that he had resisted the ethnic population policy of the SD by acting in favor of the Polish population,38 characterized the office under his supervision at the beginning of 1943 as follows:
Since my office is in charge of all ethnic policy issues-also including those dealing with resettlements-that concern the administration of the General Government, I have always been informed of the essential features of every evacuation and resettlement (Aus- und Umsiedlung).... May I point out that in 1940 and 1941 my office managed the reception and accommodation of the evacuees from the incorporated eastern regions and, in addition, centrally managed and supervised all military defense settlements that had been created earlier or are now being set up. As the government's central agency for all ethnic policy questions, I am presently involved in two military defense planning projects.39
On 27 October 1942 Weirauch, at that time director of the Office for Population Policy and Welfare, participated as the General Government's representative in the third "Conference on the Final Solution."40 A private letter of his deputy, Walther Fohl, documents the daily routine of the office:
Every day we receive and take care of trains from all over Europe, each carrying over 1,000 Jews. We put them up more or less provisionally or, for the most part, push them off into the White Ruthenian swamps, in the direction of the Arctic Ocean where, if they have survived (which the Jews from the Kurfurstendamm or from Vienna and Bratislava certainly will not), they will all congregate toward the end of the war, but not before having built some highways. (But one should not talk about this!)41
Arlt and his men, among them the informant of the Foreign Institute in Stuttgart, Dr. Hans Hopf,42 were faced in the General Government with a wealth of qualitative and quantitative problems. Thus Weirauch lamented the incapacity of the Polish workers and peasants to be civilized: "Just as each individual person is at a great loss to understand the most primitive requirements concerning his bodily cleanliness, so the workers and peasants as a whole demonstrate little love of order, organization, and little determination to achieve something."43
Arlt admitted that the racial hatred of the German occupation forces for the Polish "subhumans" and the Eastern Jews in the General Government was identical with the hatred of the propertied for the poor, thus reclassifying class differences as racial categories: "The social stratification of the population in the General Government is therefore simultaneously a racial stratification."44 Racial policy was associated with a social regrouping process, and thus the Office of Population Policy and Welfare regarded it as the task of the German administration in the General Government to
eliminate the influence exerted by the Polish upper classes that was damaging to the whole of the country but, at the same time, give them the opportunity to do useful work for the general reconstruction. In addition, it was necessary to pull the mass of Polish workers and peasants out of their dull inertia and encourage them to engage in productive activity.45
The factor disturbing the statisticians of the Office for Population Policy and Welfare in this task was the overpopulation in the General Government, "for the size of the population corresponds in no way to the possibility of satisfying the needs of the population.46 As with Meinhold, the way to resolve the situation was through the "expansion of the space for food," which meant land improvement and increased crop yields per hectare in agriculture, or else the "reduction of the size of the population." In this respect, a beginning had already been made. As Arlt calculated, "thousands have dropped out of the population stock as victims of war." Moreover, "due to the consequences of war ... mortality [is] higher ... than it has been until now." Infants, old people, those who are too weak to live, the infirm, and the sick are "the groups most subject to the dying-off process."47 Yet at the same time, the activity of Arlt himself intensified the problem of overpopulation. He reported in June 1940:
We helped to implement the evacuations and resettlements from the German eastern territory, the Ist immediate plan (40,000 Poles and Jews), 2nd current plan (120,000 Poles and Jews), as well as a portion of the 35,000 gypsies who were announced to us. In cooperation with the district chiefs, the number of resettlements have thus been established district by district and the necessary provisioning as well as the transports have been taken in hand.
In addition, there was a plan for the "remigration of escaped and prisoner-of- war Poles from Hungary and Rumania."
We are dealing here with approximately 40,000 men from each country. 450,000 Jews are to be deported to the region of the General Government from Greater Germany. [Moreover, it is] planned to resolve the gypsies question by deporting approximately 35,000 gypsies into these parts.48
The groups forcibly driven into the General Government burdened its economic structure all the more as all their possessions had been seized:
In view of the high degree of overpopulation, the problems of the General Government can no longer be solved without recourse to the public welfare system. There is the added factor that the number of those who cannot support themselves on their own, or must be supported in their daily lives by the public at large, is constantly rising.49
The solution Arlt had proposed was not only to cut down population growth by means of forced resettlements, but also to remove at once the original overpopulation. And like Meinhold, Arlt too wanted to combine the expulsion and destruction of human beings with the "rehabilitation" of both economy and population policy, as well as the modernization of the General Government. With the removal of the Jews, "the living space of the General Government would be relieved of about 1,500,000 Jews." Population density would thus be reduced from 126 to 110 people per square kilometer, a size which, "while the possibility of seasonal migration to the German labor market is maintained, " promises to be a "successful, constructive solution. " Thus,
At first, a great number of employment opportunities would be provided for the local, non-Jewish population; that is, that part of the Polish population that is unemployed or underemployed would experience essential relief.... By way of a sociological restructuring process, some of these Poles could then occupy the positions in industry, trade, and the crafts that the Jews had previously possessed. This would constitute an essential contribution to the social recovery of the Polish agricultural proletariat. At the same time, such relief for the majority of rural workers would provide further opportunities for dealing constructively with the problem of overpopulation.50
The sociological concept of "social regrouping"-"socially regrouped Jews" (Umschichtungsjuden)51 were also mentioned-became a synonym for deportation. For Arlt and Weirauch, the destruction of the Jews was a matter of population policy; and they also knew how to assert that way of looking at things outside their office and impose it even upon the coterie of their opponents.
In December 1942, the public health officer (Amtsarzt) in Warsaw, Dr. Wilhelm Hagen, wrote a worried letter to Hitler. At a meeting on tuberculosis, he had learned from Weirauch that while resettling 200,000 Poles "so that German military peasants (Wehrbauern) could be settled," it was intended "to proceed against a third of the Poles70,000 old people and children under ten years old-in the same manner as against the Jews, that is, to kill them." Hagen suspected that "the idea probably arose because at the moment there seems to be no space for the Poles that are to be resettled, insofar as they cannot be utilized directly for labor work in the armaments industry.52
Hagen's scruples, however, involved only the fact that it was intended to proceed against the Poles "in the same manner. " He objected because, on the one hand, this would supply new grounds for agitation to the Reich's opponents in the General Government as well as in foreign countries and, on the other hand, in terms of the population policy, he thought such a procedure unreasonable:
From the perspective of population policy, thorough considerations have convinced me that we have no interest in the reduction of the size of the Polish population or the impairment of the upward population trend. Of all foreign laborers, the Pole should be regarded, in the racial sense, as an element that is close to us and very much less of a danger than the races of the southeast, whose population pressures we will not be able to withstand permanently with just our own strength.53
If one follows Hagen's line of argument, then genocide based on population policy was indeed something worth discussing, something already practiced; and Hitler and Hagen obviously agreed that, insofar as the Jews were concerned, population policy required that they be killed.
The Project Concerning the Polish Middle Class
The idea of a far-reaching rearrangement at the cost of the Jews in Poland, as Arlt had developed from a sociological point of view, supplemented economic policy strategies. When Dr. Walter Emmerich of Hamburg, who had been appointed on 13 June 1940 as the new chief of the Central Office for Economy in the General Government, explained "the basic principles of the economic policy he intended to pursue" to Hans Frank, they resembled ArIt's population policy plans. According to Emmerich, "the prerequisite for a successful economic activity" consisted of "a fundamental change in the entire economic structure." Already in his first days in office, it was clear to Emmerich how this was to take place. As he explained to Frank, "first, a significant rationalization has to take place in the Jewish sector." Moreover, "in place of the many small businesses, viable medium-sized businesses must be established," of course by non-Jewish Poles: "Compression of the Jewish sector would create the possibility for advancement of the Polish sector.... Naturally, this commercial migration would have to be organized in such a way that it does not transpire without restraint.54 Emmerich meant thereby the orderly despoilment through the use of laws, trustees, and the exertion of the state's monopoly of power.
The small Jewish retail trade (Meinhandel) could not be controlled by German wholesalers, but this could be done through the newly created and artificial "medium-sized enterprises" (Mittelexistenzen). If locally limited Jewish trade had made the imperialist penetration of the newly conquered "spaces" difficult, the projected "commercial migration" would open up the markets of the East. For this purpose, Emmerich suggested the establishment of a German-Polish chamber of commerce with the proviso that the leadership of all its institutional functions rest in German hands: "Poles should only cooperate, but should not make decisions." Frank assured his new economics minister of his "unconditional support" for these plans.
The appointment of Emmerich turned out to be an economic policy coup for Hamburg. Severely cut off from its old trading partners by the war, the commercial firms of the Hanseatic city demanded compensation in the East.55 The warehouses of the trading companies of Hamburg and Bremen were filled with goods, which since the outbreak of war could not be exported and would find no buyers in Germany either. The products, favored by the high, artificially maintained course of the zloty, would be dumped on the new General Government market. The Reich Economic Ministry initially gave these firms the right to import goods valued at ten million reichsmarks into the General Government.56 After only three months, the markets had already been divided among the firms. The Ostdeutscher Beobachter reported that "a number of trustworthy German wholesale trading firms [have been] commissioned ... to set up a commercial enterprise in each of the 40 districts." As investment capital, they had already brought along supplies of goods that, due to the war, the Reich could no longer export. As their umbrella organization, the firms established "The German Merchants Trading Company, Inc." in order to "achieve a satisfactory position vis-a-vis production in the General Government as well as in transactions with the authorities."57 Altogether, 22 of the most prestigious commercial firms from Hamburg and nine from Bremen established themselves in the General Government as "district wholesale traders" doing business without competition.58 Ultimately, the Germans also planned to extend this practice, which they also pursued after the occupation in the Soviet Union in the General Commissariat Ostland, with the inclusion of Dutch, and even French, Belgian, and Swiss wholesale trading firms.
Emmerich did not arrive in Poland by himself. To head the desk that handled basic economic policies in his office, Emmerich appointed Max Biehl, who had formerly edited the Wirtschaftsdienst of Hamburg. To head the economics section in the German Institute for Projects in the East, Emmerich, who simultaneously (in Personalunion) headed this Institute, procured Helmut Meinhold, an economist who in 1935 had received his economics degree in Hamburg. Meinhold's two assistants, Hans Kraft Nonnenmacher and Erika Bochdam-Loptien, also came from Hamburg. Emmerich himself had studied economics in Hamburg between 1922 and 1930 and had then worked at the University of Hamburg until he transferred in 1934 to become a civil servant in the agency for economics of the government of Hamburg. In Cracow, he saw himself "as the man from Hamburg in an exposed and advanced position," as one of those persons "who have the courage to make himself available for work in the east" and took care that "the lines to Hamburg" would not be Cut off.59 Emmerich and his co-workers not only represented the economic interests of Hamburg; they also belonged to the Kiel-Hamburg school, especially famous through the Kiel Institute of World Economics, which combined economic theory and economic practice in such an excellent and farsighted manner.
Frank's appointment of the highly educated Emmerich as the economics minister of his government in Cracow, which was just being consolidated, was part of a comprehensive concept that placed expertise above party dogmas. Emmerich had joined the Nazi Party only in 1937 in order to promote his official career, and his attitude to it remained quite critical. He regarded it as his task to make clear to the uneducated minor officials of the party in Cracow that they knew nothing about economic policy and should leave the restructuring of this important sector to specialists and experts, such as himself.60
This article originated at the Institute for Social Research in Hamburg in conjunction with the project entitled "Biographies of the Perpetrators" (Taterbiografien). Together with Peter Chroust, Hans Dieter Heilman, and Christian Pross, our project group focuses on the careers of German intellectuals before, during, and after the Third Reich. Our investigations have directed us to the rational core of a regime that by virtue of its historically unique crimes is usually characterized as extremely irrational. Tracing the development of individual careers, how they intersected and converged at certain points, we have come across personalities that do not fit the image of the henchman at all, yet provided the reasons and the means for the mass murders committed by the Nazi state. For a different version of our thesis, see Beitrage zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik, Vol. 5 (Berlin, 1987), pp. llff.
1 . Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal [Blue Series], 42 vols. (Nuremberg, 1947-49), 26: 266ff.
2. See Beitrage zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik, Vols. 1 and 2 (Berlin, 1985).
3. Susanne Heim and Gotz Aly, Ein Berater der Macht: Helmut Meinhold oder der Zusammenhang zwischen Sozialpolitik und Judenvernichtung (Hamburg and Berlin, 1986). Because Meinhold had since 1959 been one of the most important political advisers on domestic affairs for all West German governments, this essay was originally conceived as part of a political dispute surrounding the planned celebration in his honor.
4. Preliminary studies about this subject are to be found in Gotz Aly and Karl Heinz Roth, Die restlose Erfassung. Volkszahlen, Identifizieren, Aussondern im Nationalsozialismus (Berlin, 1984).
5. See Peter-Heinz Seraphim, Das Judentum im Osteuropaischen Raum (Essen, 1938); Theodor Oberlander, Die agrarische Uberbevolkerung Polens (Berlin, 1935); F. Ross, Der Bevolkerungsdruck im deutsch-polnischen Grenzgebiet, ed. Theodor Oberlander (Ms., Konigsberg, 1936); Peter-Heinz Seraphim, ed., Polen und seine Wirtschaft (Konigsberg, 1937).
6. Oberlander, Agrarische Uberbevolkerung, p. 116.
7. Peter-Heinz Seraphim, "Wirkung der Neustaatenbildung im Nachkriegseuropa auf Wirtschaftsstruktur und Weltniveau," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 41 (1936): 399.
8. For German economic policy in the General Governnient generally and its dangerous turn toward becoming a constructive policy, see Tadeusz Kudyba, "Die strukturelle Veranderung der polnischen Wirtschaft wahrend der Besatzungszeit," rer. pol. diss., University of Bonn, 1950. Kudyba, who had grown up in the area of Zamosc and was later incarcerated in Mauthausen-Gusen, reached at that time a conclusion that is partly similar to ours, but which thereafter was not raised again in the literature.
His conclusion stated that "in the context of the German body politic, the economic structure of the Polish region was not to be rationalized by improving on the factor at fault, that is, by increasing the number of places of work, but by reducing the factor that existed in excess, namely, the human beings, achieving this through a process of destruction." Ibid. p. 158. See also Ludwik Toronczyk, "Die deutsche Wirtschafts-, Kultur-, und Bevolkerungspolitik im Generalgouvernement und in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten in den Jahren 1939-1945," Ph.D. diss., University of Vienna, 1951; Gerhard Eisenblatter, "Grundlinien der Politik des Reiches gegenuber dem Generalgouvernement, 1939-1945, " Ph.D. diss., University of Frankfurt, 1969; Berthold Puchert, "Fragen der Wirtschaftspolitik im okkupierten Polen 1939 bis 1945, mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der IG Farbeninclustrie AG," Habilitation, University of Berlin [East], 1968.
9. Peter-Heinz Seraphim, "Die Wirtschaftsbecleutung des Judentums in Polen," Wirtschaftsdienst, No. 11 (1939): 362.
10. See Maria Zelzer, Stuttgart unterm Hakenkreuz (Stuttgart, 1983), pp. 253, 389; Karl Strolin, Stuttgart im Endstadium des Krieges (Stuttgart, 1950), p. 64. (This reference was kindly provided by Mr. Hans Heilman.)
11. Koblenz, Bundesarchiv [hereafter cited as BA], R 57 [Deutsches AuslandsInstitut] / 344, 345: Dr. Konekamp, Polenfahrt vorn 29.11 bis 9.12.1939 (Umsiedlung der Juden ins ostliche Generalgouvernement).
12. Helmut Meinhold, review of Die raumliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft (Jena, 1940) by August Lbsch, in Die Burg 3, no. 3 (1942): 360.
13. BA, R 52 IV/144a: Helmut Meinhold, "Die Erweiterung des Generalgouvernements nach Osten. A. Allgemeines" (Manuskriptreihe des Instituts fidr Deutsche Ostarbeit, vertraulich), July 1941. Apparently, this is identical with the less aggressively cited report "Die ostlichen Nachbargebiete des Generalgouvernements. A. Allgemeines," documented in Die Burg 3, no. 3 (1942): 357.
14. Ibid.: Meinhold, "Erweiterung des Generalgouvernements nach Osten," P. 1.
15. Helmut Meinhold, "Die Arbeiterreserven des Generalgouvernements," Die Burg 3, no. 3 (1942): 80 [hereafter cited as "Arbeiterreserven"].
16. Idem, "Die nichtlandwirtschaftliche (Uberbevolkerung im ehemaligen Polen," Ostraumberichte, Neue Folge 1 (1942): 128.
17. Ibid., p. 132. From January 1941 to August 1942, Meinhold served as an expert in the economics section of the Institute for German Projects in the East, and was in practice its head. At this institute the bases for the practical policies of the German occupation forces of the General Government were developed. In 1943 Meinhold was transferred by his superior and patron Walter Emmerich, the economics minister of the General Government, to the Central Office for Economics.
18. BA R 52 IV/144d: Helmut Meinhold, Die Industrialisierung des Generalgouvernements (Manusckriptreihe des Instituts fur Deutsche Ostarbeit, Nur ffir den Dienstgebrauch), Dec. 1941, p. 52 [hereafter cited as Industrialisierung].
19. Ibid., p. 140. Mombert's study does not discuss the space available for food (Nahrungsraum), but the scope for getting food (Nahrungsspielraum). With this is meant, to the exclusion of all else, the capacity to supply food; that is, the combination of the productive factors of labor, land, and capital, but never space in the geographic sense of the word. By changing the formula, Meinhold brutalized the scientific concept at the same time. The expansion of the space available for food can thus always mean the military conquest of other countries. But even if he was cited incorrectly in a significant way, Mombert's way of looking at things was basically not dissimilar from that of Meinhold. Mombert, too, was not primarily concerned about how to secure a sufficient supply of food for human beings, but about the optimal yield that can be gained from labor; he also dealt with a variable population size. Nevertheless, the context in which he evolved his "population science" was diametrically opposed to Meinhold's. Mombert confronted above all the question of the declining birth rate in industrialized countries. Thus, the question never arose for him of how to remove excess population, but, on the contrary, how to assure a sufficiently large population. According to his ideal notion, the "optimum population" was to be found in the development population and economy in such a way that the population is sufficiently large to utilize all gifts of nature to the fullest extent so that the yield of labor, and therewith also the standard of life, can reach the highest level under the given economic conditions. Of course, it can be the case that ... this optimum of the population cannot be reached, indeed, that a nation, when its population is declining, might be thrown back from this optimal situation after it might have almost reached it at one time.
Paul Mombert, "Bevolkerungslehre," Grundrisse zum Studium der Nationalokonomie (Jena, 1929), Vol. 15.
20. Industrialisicrung, p. 140.
21. Ibid., pp. 135f.
22. Ibid., pp. 41 f.
23. See "Arbeiterreserven," pp. 282f.
24. Industrialisicrung, pp. 167f.
25. Ibid., p. 186.
26. Ibid., p. 161.
27. See Waclaw Dlugoborski, "Die deutsche Besatzungspolitik und Veranderungen der sozialen Struktur Polens 1939-1945, " in Zweiter Weltkrieg u nd sozialer Wandel, ed. Waclaw Dlugoborski (Gottingen, 1981), p. 350.
28. Industrialisierung, p. 165.
29. Hans-Kraft Normenmacher, "Die Wirtschaftsstruktur des galizischen Erdolgebietes," Deutsche Forschungen im Osten 1, no. 6 (1941): 15ff.
30. The Ustasha was the fascist movement of Croatia, whose leaders established a particularly bloody regime in 1941 as the puppet government of the Germans.
31. Zentrales Staatsarchiv der DDR: Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung der I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, "Die Wirtschaftsstruktur Kroatiens (Vowi 4479), Bericht vom 23.3.1942, gez. Dr. Br." For this reference we wish to thank Dr. Martin Seckendorf of the Staatliche Archivverwaltung der DDR, who is an acknowledged authority on Nazi policies in Southeastern Europe.
32. Michael Weichert, Judische Selbsthilfe 1939-1945 [Yiddish] (Tel Aviv, 1966) provides a totally erroneous interpretation of the Office for Population Policy and Welfare, which minimizes its role. Dr. Weichert was the director of the Jewish Social Self-Help (Selbsthilfe) and was involved in many negotiations with Arlt, Fohl, Turk, and Weirauch. He did not see through the German functionaries sitting across from him, and he arrived at a wrong assessment of the Office by viewing it only from the perspective of charity. See also Michael Weichert, Der Krieg [Yiddish] (Tel Aviv, 1963). The same mistake is made by a newer Polish work, which takes up on this longtime taboo theme. See Bogdan Kroll, Rada Growna Opiekunncza (Warsaw, 1985). By contrast, the Jewish historical commission in Poland correctly documented the Office quite early and correctly. See Josef Kermisz, ed., Dokumenty i Materialy, Dziejow Okupacji Niernieckiej W Poloscz, Vol. 2: "Akcje i Wysiedlenia" (Warsaw, Lodz, Cracow, 1946).
33. Prior to this, Arlt had. been chief (Gauamtsleiter) of the Race Political Office (Rassenpolitisches Amt) in Silesia; he belonged to the SD and had organized courses in Jewish Studies for Eichmann's Office (Referat) IV b 4 of the Central Office for Reich Security (Reichssicherheitshauptamt). During his activities as director of the Office for Population Policy and Welfare in Cracow, he retained some of his functions in Kattowitz. For example, from 1940 to 1942, he worked as plenipotentiary of the Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German Race (Reichskommissar zur Festigung des deutschen Volkstums) in both Cracow and Kattowitz, and at the end of 1940 he shifted the main focus of his work to Kattowitz. After the war, he first found accommodation at the Red Cross; then he became a managing member of the Federal Association of the German Employers' Union (Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbande) as well as its representative inter alia at the Youth Board of the West German Government and the Board of the German-French Youth-Work (Deutsch-Franzosisches Jugendwerk). He also maintained excellent relations with the trade unions. Although Fritz Arlt's file at the Berlin Document Center [BDC] contains a lot of information, the judicial proceedings against him (Staatsanwaltschaft Dortmund, Verfahren 45 Js 49/61) failed, due to the incompetence, or perhaps the unwillingness, of the authorities; and they were suspended in 1966. The records of the proceedings contain few relevant documents, and no attempts were made to shed light on the former activities of the Office for Population Policy and Welfare.
34. BA, R 52 11 [Kanzlei des Generalgouverneursl]247: Bericht uber den Aufbau der Verwaltung im Generalgouvernement, p. 182.
37. See Dokumenty i Materialy, Vol. 2, passim.
38. BA, Ost Dok. 13, no. 248: Affidavit of Else v. Scheidt, 2 June 1947.
39. BA, NS 19/1210: Lothar Weirauch, Leiter der Abt. Bevolkerungswesen und Fursorge, to HSSPF Wilhelm Kriiger, 4 Dec. 1943.
40. See The Warmsee Protocol, Vol. 11 of The Holocaust: Selected Documents, ed. John Mendelsohn (New York, 1982), pp. 120ff. (from Nuremberg Document NG- 2586). After the war, Weirauch became a Ministerialdirigent in Bonn and conducted an almost friendly, but from Weirauch's side thoroughly mendacious, correspondence with Weichert (located in BA, Ost Dok. 13, no. 246: Briefwechsel Weichert-Weirauch).
41. BDC dossier Walter Fohl: Fohl to "SS-Kameraden zuhause, " 21 June 1942.
42. Another career can explain why so little was known about the Office for Population Policy and Welfare. Dr. Hans Hopf worked there as a "genealogist," which means that he directed the careful selection and recording of human beings according to their "ethnicity"; this was an important bureaucratic prerequisite for the Holocaust. After the war, Hopf became an archivist at the West German Federal Archives in Koblenz. There Hopf created the "Documentation East" (Ostdokumentation), a sizable, largely pseudo-documentary sanitizing operation for former members of the German occupation authorities. Nevertheless, this little used collection, which is not exactly being pushed on archive users, is an interesting source if used correctly.
43. Lothar Weirauch, "Die Volksgruppen im Generalgouvernement," Europaische Revue 18 (May 1942): 251 [hereafter cited as "Volksgruppen"].
44. Fritz Arlt, Ubersicht uber die Bevolkerungsverhdltnisse im Generalgouvernement (Cracow, 1940), p. 41 [hereafter cited as Ubersicht].
45. Weirauch, "Volksgruppen," p. 251.
46. Arlt, Ubersicht, p. 19.
47. Ibid., p. 9.
48. BA, R 52 11/247: Bericht uber den Aufbau der Verwaltung, p. 201.
49. Ibid., p. 196.
50. Arlt, Ubersicht, p. 21.
51. See, for example, the important article by Miroslav Karny, "Die 'Judenfrage' in der nazistischen Okkupationspolitik," Historica, 21 (Prague, 1982):178.
52. BA, NS 19/1210: Dr. Wilhelm Hagen, Stacltmedizinalrat von Warschau, to "Fuhrer des GroBdeutschen Reiches, Adolf Hitler," 7 Dec. 1942.
54. Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen, ed. Werner Prag and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer (Stuttgart, 1975), pp. 244f. [hereafter cited as Diensttagebuch]. Sections of the diary not included in this abbreviated published edition will be cited by date from the complete diary located in BA, R 52 1.
55. On this, see also Bremer Nachrichten, 21 June 1940: The director of the Office for Economy, Privy Councillor Dr. Zetsche, was relieved of his responsibilities in accordance with his own wish. He is replaced by the Syndicus of the Senate and departmental adviser, Dr. Emmerich from Hamburg. In order to supply the General Government with goods, namely agrarian products, a number of German wholesale trading firms, which previously were engaged in export and are situated mainly in the Hanseatic cities, have been taken to the General Government. Firms from Danzig are said to follow.
56. Diensttagebuch, p. 226.
57. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, n.d. [ca. April 19401.
58. See BA, R 52 VI [Generalgouvernement, Hauptabteilung Wirtschaft]/20, for a list of the district wholesalers in the General Government (and their parent branches). They were as follows: Staudt & Co., Berlin; Breckwoldt & Co., Hamburg; C.F. Eckhardt, Furth i.B.; H.A. Lerchen & Co., Berlin; Athen & Haupt, Hamburg; Schutte & Bunernarm, Bremen; Jos. Hansen & Sohne, Hamburg; C. Andre & Co., Hamburg; Willi Fuhrhop, Hamburg; Freclk. Mo11er Sohne, Bremen; Deutsch-Westafrikanische Handelsgesellschaft, Hamburg; "Webbers" Gebr. Webendorfer, Hamburg; Walther C. Tobbens, Bremen; Jos. Hansen & Sohne, Hamburg; Hansing & Co., Hamburg; Bieling Gebruder, Hamburg; Heinrich Kramer, Bremen; Dietrich Dirksen, Danzig; Georg Kadgiehn, Bromberg; "Edeka," Danzig; H. Hommel, Kom-Ges., Koln; Georg Frode, Marienburg (WestpreuBen); Gerhard Eggebrecht, Danzig; Gebr. Weyersberg, Solingen-Ohligs; C. Illies & Co., Berlin-Charlottenburg; Tetzlaff & Wenzel, Danzig; Hugo Claassen, Danzig; Fritz Bogut, Danzig-Schidlitz; C. Woermann, Hamburg; G.L. Gaiser, Hamburg; "Dekage" Handels-Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg; Golhicke & Rothfos, Bremen; C.F. Corssen & Co., Bremen; Overbeck & C., G.m.b.H., Bremen; Schmidt & Luhmann, Bremen; Wilhelm Eicke & Co., Bremen; Carlowitz & Co., Hamburg; Breckwoldt & Co., Bremen; Kunst & Albers, Hamburg; Gesellschaft f0r AuBenhandel m.b.H., Wien; Adolf Gleue, Hamburg; Louis Delius & Co., Bremen; J. Winckler, Hamburg; Ulrich Thomas, Danzig; Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellsch., Berlin; Oscar H. Jencquel, Hamburg; F.D. Warnholtz, Hamburg; G.L. Gaiser, Hamburg.
59. See BA, R 52 IV, pp. 69, 82, 89, for the personnel files of Meinhold, Bochdam- Loptien, and Normenmacher.
60. Based on oral communications from various persons who had either worked closely with Emmerich or known him well. After the war Emmerich was interned in Neuengamme for two years, but a request for his extradition by the Polish government failed because of the resistance of the British military government.