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Genocide: Ch 9 Aftermath, Part 1



A Symbol of Hope

It was 10 o'clock In the morning, with a bright sun shining down to help us to celebrate the moment of liberation. The American tanks entered the camp, and every prisoner struggled to get to them. I was about 150 yards from the first tank. The soldiers who had come were surrounded by prisoners sinking into their arms, crying, laughing at the same time, exulted beyond their ordinary feeling. I covered the first 100 yards, but then I collapsed on the ground. I was lying there, trying to get up again, panting and staring, fascinated as the American flag fluttered on the top.

I could not take my eyes from the stars of the flag, symbols not only of the States of the Union, but of all the things we had lost in the Holocaust. Every star had acquired a meaning of its own: One was the star of hope, and that of justice, of tolerance, friendship, of brotherly love, of understanding, and so on.

A little later, we saw prisoners from other blocks marching by, carrying their national flags-Czechs, Poles, Italians, and many others. They had secretly prepared them for the day of liberation. I looked around me, we were all Jews; I asked: "Why don't have we a flag?" I was longing for such a symbol of liberty and national dignity for us Jews. One of us had a blue shirt, I had one which had once been white. We took them off, and another prisoner managed to make them into something like a blue-and-white flag.

We were much too weak to attempt a parade like the other nationalities, and so we just sat there in the sun, holding zip, waving our makeshift flag. Jews from other blocks came over to us and cried, some of them kissed the flag, a symbol of hope amidst the dead and the dying.

-Simon Wiesenthal

From the Holocaust to the Establishment of the State of Israel

At the end of the war, there were over ten million displaced persons (DPs) in Germany and Austria, including concentration camp inmates, prisoners of war, slave laborers, voluntary workers, and foreign volunteers who had been transported to the borders of the Third Reich during the last months of the way. The existence of these millions of displaced persons did not come as a surprise to the Allies, although estimates of the expected refugee population ranged from nine to thirty million. In 1943, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was founded to help the Western armies repatriate and resettle the vast number of uprooted people, since the Allies recognized that the task could not be accomplished by the military authorities alone. While UNRRA was to provide medical, welfare, and administrative workers to aid the DPs, they could not operate in the liberated areas without consent of the military authorities. The Soviet army was the only one, however, not to use UNRRA. Instead, it repatriated the DPs in its zone as quickly as they were able to travel.1

The DP Camps

In an attempt to bring some order to the processing and care of the DPs, a special Displaced Persons Executive (DPX) was established at SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces). SHAEF incorrectly assumed, however, that many of these people had left their homeland unwillingly, were eager to return, and that their governments and fellow citizens would welcome them back. While millions of non-Jews did return to their former homes, those who had collaborated with or worked for the German army or industry were reluctant to return. They feared prosecution for their involvement with the Nazis. Many who had left Soviet territory also refused to go home because they wanted to live in freedom.2

Of all the DPs, the Jewish survivors presented the Allied armies with especially difficult problems. The majority of Jews who had survived were found in Concentration Camps.3 The consequences of many years of maltreatment included malnutrition and severe medical problems. When the American and British armies entered the Concentration Camps in Germany and Austria in April and May, 1945, they found rampant epidemics, above all widespread typhoid. In Buchenwald and other camps, the American Medical Corps worked to save everyone they could, but large numbers of former inmates died.4

Of the approximately 200,000 Jews who were liberated from the camps, about three-quarters of them returned to their former homelands. Jews from western Europe (France, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway), Hungary (the largest group), Rumania, and Czechoslovakia were eager to be repatriated so that they could look for their families, reclaim their possessions, and reestablish themselves.

Most of the 65,000 surviving Jews from Poland and Lithuania were reluctant to go back home.5 Many wondered what purpose would be served by returning "to streets empty of Jews, towns empty of Jews, a world without Jews. To wander in these lands, lonely, homeless, always with the tragedy before one's eyes. . . " would have been just too difficult to bear.6

Yet, some Jews-how many is not known-went back to Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia to search for family and friends. Wherever they went in eastern Europe, they found surprise and disappointment that they had survived. Also, they were subjected to absurd harassments, including arrests on the charge of collaborating with the Nazis. Most found that their homes and property, if they were intact, were in the hands of new owners; the possibility of restitution of such property was nonexistent.7 Those who were "bold" enough to ask for the return of their possessions did so at the risk of their lives. Accounts of Jews being murdered throughout Poland were not uncommon, despite the Polish government's efforts to prevent such acts.8

Once their search was completed, these Jews often returned to Germany. According to an agreement reached by the Allies, Germany was divided into four zones: French, Soviet, British, and American. The French occupied the Rhineland and the Saar Valley; the Soviets occupied eastern Germany; and the British were in northwestern Germany. The American zone included the southern states of Bavaria, Hesse, and North Wurttemberg-Baden; Bremen and Bremerhaven in the British zone; and a portion of Berlin, which was under the joint authority of all four powers.9 Austria was treated as a separate entity, also under four-power occupation.10

Except for the Russians, who refused to acknowledge that a DP problem existed in their zone, the other Allies assumed responsibility for the DPs in their areas.11 Some of the problems that the Jews posed for the Allies included their legal status; their need for food, clothing, shelter, rehabilitation, and medical care; and their desire to reestablish contact with relatives and friends. After years of systematic persecution and mass murder by the Nazis, the Jews assumed that the Allies would provide special treatment for them. In particular, they expected separate camps where they would not have to share facilities with their former guards and tormentors. "How could we ever have believed that at the end of the war the surviving Jews would have no more worries, that everything would be fine! " asked one Buchenwald survivor. "The world, we had thought, would welcome our few survivors with open arms! We, the first victims of the Nazis. They would love us! Quickly enough, we saw that the world had other things on its mind than Jewish suffering."12

It soon became clear that the Allies had no intentions of treating the Jews any better than the other DPs. The British refused to do so lest the Jews use then- special status as leverage to obtain visas to enter Palestine, which the British vehemently opposed.13 The Americans also rejected the idea of special consideration, but for different reasons.

One reason was given in an American War Department pamphlet in 1944: "As a general rule, [United States] Military Government should avoid creating the impression that the Jews are to be singled out for special treatment, as such action will tend to perpetuate the distinction of Nazi racial theory."14 The Americans thought this was a real danger; even some American Jewish soldiers were persuaded by this curious logic.15

To ensure that persons who had been persecuted "because of their race, religion, or activities in favor of the United Nations" were accorded the same treatment granted to the United Nations DPs, the DPX issued an administrative memorandum to its unit commanders on April 16, 1945.16 This and similar memoranda were not heeded by the local commanders, which caused difficulties for Jewish survivors. Jews from Germany, Austria, and other Axis countries, for example, were not treated as United Nations DPs, but rather as belonging to former enemy nations. At the same time, Jews from non enemy countries were often forced into DP camps and installations with their former guards and killers.17

In general, the survivors suffered from intolerable living conditions, inadequate food and clothing, and the lack of freedom to choose their own destinies. Rabbi Abraham J. Klausner, an American army chaplain who surveyed the plight of approximately 1,400 Jews in Bavaria during May and June, 1945, sent a report to the leadership of American Jews about conditions in Germany. At one camp, he found that Jews still lived behind double barbed wire fences that were electrically charged. Everywhere soap, linens, toothbrushes, and laundry facilities were unobtainable. Even at better camps, accommodations were overcrowded, people slept on the floors, and cellars were converted into dormitories. Plumbing, when available, was always inadequate.

Food was scarce in the immediate postwar period; people charged that they had received more in the Concentration Camps. The average intake per day was between 900 to 1,000 calories. The clothing situation was no better, since the majority of Jews were still clothed in their striped prisoner uniforms. Although responsible for assisting the survivors, UNRRA was unable to do anything at first, while the Red Cross helped for only a short period at the end of the war. A limited number of Jews received some clothes from the Dachau storehouse because of Klausner's intervention.

Another problem was the lack of any overall plan for the supervision or dissolution of the camps. One unnamed camp was under the control of the Military Government, another under the Dachau Command (of the American army), and a third was under the jurisdiction of still another military unit. American officers in charge of these camps had little or no training. At two camps, they operated under their own improvised rules. In Pensing, the commanding officer of the airport arbitrarily forced sixty Jews to leave an area requisitioned by the Military Government without the slightest concern about where they could go. Klausner summarized the predicament of the Jews: "Liberated but not free-that is the paradox of the Jew. In the concentration camp, his whole being was consumed with the hope of salvation. That hope was his life, for that he was willing to suffer. Saved, his hope evanesces, for no new source of hope has been given him. Suffering continues to be his badge."18 Klausner's criticism was, in part, a response to United States military indifference and at times outright hostility to the Jewish survivors.

The negative attitude of the American military towards the Jews had several causes. Many officers could not comprehend why Jews would not return to their former homelands or why they wanted recognition as a separate nationality. Part of the problem, as already noted, was that the American army failed to understand the unique situation of the Jews and informed its officers not to treat Jews differently than other DPs. As a result, the soldiers perceived the Jews as an added burden and did not want to be responsible for providing them with food (which had to be confiscated from the Germans) or other necessities. In some cases, the soldiers feared that then- careers would be damaged by adverse reaction from the military if they mishandled their involvement with the DPs.

Furthermore, many officers were combat soldiers uncomfortable in their new role as civilian administrators; they resented anyone who disturbed the status quo. As one authority of the American occupation has noted, "Some Military Government detachments conceived themselves as perfectly free agents and a few even boasted that they had thrown away their handbooks and read almost nothing which came to them" from the American army. Some officers expressed surprise that Washington was interested in Germany's problems and that there was any place in field operations for policy decisions made in Washington.19

These attitudes are not surprising, since the Military Government personnel had been trained "to get communication and transport going again, behind a front line, not to govern." With rare exception, they knew "nothing about Germany." They did not speak the language, had to rely upon "unreliable interpreters," and had not been taught German history, politics, or economics. Moreover, "they knew next to nothing about how to deal with the wreckage of human minds and spirits which was to constitute one of their major responsibilities in Germany."20 It should be noted that there were many American officers and soldiers who were deeply moved by the plight of the Jewish DPs and tried to assist them. A few even helped Jews illegally to enter the American zone of Germany.

A large percentage of the "officers who had been trained went home in the first six months of occupation because they had sufficient points to be discharged." Those who stayed were "disheartened by the chaotic conditions in which they had to work, by the absence of any clear idea of what they were supposed to do, and by the hopeless inadequacy of the 'teenage' replacements." Most commanders of tactical units and their troops did not understand the role of the Military Government and were reluctant to allow its personnel to function in territory Linder their control.21

These problems affected the survivors and were further exacerbated by UNRRA's inability to function effectively from the start. UNRRX workers were often chosen in haste and poorly trained; many were incompetent, inefficient, unable to adapt, and incapable of communicating with the DPs because they lacked knowledge of the requisite languages. Moreover, UNRRA policies were confused, programs were uncoordinated and poorly administered, and, in general, the organization was on poor terms with the army.22

The American Jewish joint Distribution Committee (JDC), a social services agency that aided Jews outside the United States, wanted to assist the survivors immediately after the cessation of hostilities. The army, at that point, however, would not permit the JDC to enter Germany because it did not want civilian relief agencies not directly under its control to interfere with its own occupation and relief efforts. Once the military was ready for the JDC, it would be allowed into Germany and Austria. If the JDC entered earlier, the army feared, Protestant and Catholic relief agencies would also demand the same right.23 Individual JDC representatives did enter Germany and Austria in 1945, but it took many months for them to provide substantial aid to the DPs. A study of the JDC's activities in Europe has not yet been published.

The Role of the American Jewish Chaplains
The absence of any well-organized relief effort meant that survivors had to rely more heavily on American Jewish chaplains, members of the Jewish Brigade (made up of Palestinian Jews serving in the British army), and on self-help. Individual American Jewish soldiers also aided the DPs, but the extent and type of their involvement has not yet been fully documented. The chaplains who came to Europe were American military personnel and were among the first Jews in Europe to meet with survivors. Although their primary obligation was to American soldiers, a number of the chaplains chose to help the DPs. They were not official representatives of the American rabbinate or any other organization in this work.

Much of their work with tire survivors involved helping them solve personal problems with the military, providing food and material goods, and trying to build morale.24 Abraham J. Klausner was one of the few chaplains who recognized that the survivors needed some control over their daily lives and a role in choosing their future residence. The survivors also reached this conclusion on their own. Klausner helped them establish a committee to determine priorities and long-range goals for the DPs and deal directly with the American military. Through their combined efforts, the Central Committee of Liberated Jews in Bavaria was established in July, 1945, with headquarters in Munich. The committee represented both the larger camps in Munich and its suburbs and the Landsmannschaften (groups formed according to national and linguistic origin) in the region.25

Another project undertaken by Klausner was to bring together the Jews of Bavaria into separate Jewish camps and hospitals for those in need of medical care. At the end of the war, every individual who was released from a concentration camp was allowed to enter one of the DP camps that was established by the army. The need for separate Jewish facilities became clear to Klausner after his extensive visits to seventeen DP camps in Bavaria. He believed that some organization or group would come and take the Jews out of Germany and he wanted them to be prepared. By consolidating them into camps, Jews would no longer be subject to harassment and mistreatment by non-Jewish inmates.26 There were also hundreds of Jewish survivors in German hospitals being cared for by German doctors, and Klausner understood that this was a traumatic experience.

Klausner ultimately succeeded in establishing three Jewish hospitals and a number of Jewish DP camps, but it took a great deal of work. He fought hard to achieve these objectives because he believed that it was an important step in the army's recognition of the Jews as a separate entity.27

The Harrison Report
While Klausner and other chaplains worked to help ameliorate conditions for fellow Jews, they recognized that American Jews had to be made aware of what was transpiring in Europe. Their reports, and those sent by American Jewish soldiers, newspaper correspondents, DPs, and other observers in Europe, aroused the American Jewish community to question the American government's handling of the situation.28 As a result, Earl G. Harrison, the dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, was sent to Europe by the State Department and President Truman to investigate what was being done for the survivors by military, governmental, and private organizations.29

Harrison's original itinerary would have bypassed most of the DP camps, but Chaplain Klausner persuaded him to change his route.30 Harrison's report to President Truman made front-page news across the United States on September 30, 1945. In it, he charged: "As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them, except that we do not exterminate them. They are ill Concentration Camps in large numbers under our military guard, instead of the SS troops. One is led to wonder whether the German people, seeing this, are not supposing that we are following or at least condoning Nazi policy."31

Harrison's somewhat exaggerated report was controversial and raised questions in Washington, D.C., about the effectiveness of Eisenhower's command. It also embarrassed Eisenhower and put him on the defensive.32 Some changes in the army's approach towards survivors occurred as a result, but it was clear that only a resolution of the DPs' status would solve the real problems.

Harrison rioted that the solution was for the United States to support a plan to settle the DPs in Palestine. "With respect to possible places of resettlement for those who may be stateless or who do not wish to return to their homes," Harrison declared, "Palestine is definitely and preeminently the first choice." He informed the president that "there is no acceptable or even decent solution for their future other than Palestine," although he pointed out that some people felt that the United States or other countries were options.33

In particular, Harrison asserted that "some reasonable extension or modification of the British White Paper of 1939," which limited Jewish emigration to Palestine to 75,000 over a five-year period beginning in that year, "ought to be possible without serious repercussions." In arguing for Palestine as the solution to the problems of Jewish statelessness, Harrison pointed out that "this is said on a purely humanitarian basis with no reference to ideological or political considerations so far as Palestine is concerned."34

A decision on this issue had to be made shortly, Harrison insisted, because certificates for immigration to Palestine would be exhausted by August, 1945. "To anyone who has visited the Concentration Camps and who has talked with the despairing survivors, it is nothing short of calamitous to contemplate that the gates of Palestine should be soon closed," he declared.35

He then noted that the "Jewish Agency for Palestine has submitted to the British government a petition that 100,000 additional immigration certificates be made available. A memorandum accompanying the petition makes a persuasive showing with respect to the immediate absorptive capacity of Palestine and the current, actual manpower shortages there....36

"While there may be room for difference of opinion as to the precise number of certificates which might tinder the circumstances be considered reasonable," Harrison observed, "there is no question but that the request thus made would, if granted, contribute much to the sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria and even other displaced Jews, who do not wish either to remain there or to return to their countries of nationality. No matter is, therefore, so important from the viewpoint of Jews in Germany and Austria and those elsewhere who have known the horrors of the Concentration Camps as is the disposition of the Palestine question."37

He also proposed that the United States "should, under existing immigration laws, permit reasonable numbers of such persons to come here ... particularly those who have family ties in this country." This was not a major issue because, he believed, "the number who desire emigration to the United States is not large." Harrison further declared that "the urgency of the situation should be recognized" because it was "Inhuman to ask people to continue to live for any length of time tinder their present conditions."38

Even before Harrison's report reached Truman, the president recognized the need for the British to remove Jewish immigration restrictions for Palestine. He reached this conclusion after hearing about the plight of European Jews and at the urging of American Jewish leadership to bring pressure on the British. Reinforcement came during the summer of 1945, when thirty-seven governors endorsed a proposal to open Palestine to the refugees.

In July, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, Truman spoke to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill about rescinding immigration restrictions. A few days later, however, Churchill's Tory party was voted out of office and Clement Attlee became the new prime minister. Before returning to the United States, Truman conferred with Attlee about this matter but nothing was resolved.39

After Truman received Harrison's report, he sent a copy to Attlee. In an accompanying cover letter dated August 31, 1945, Truman stated that "no single matter is so important for those who have known the horrors of Concentration Camps for over a decade as is the future immigration possibilities into Palestine." He urged that the British government grant 100,000 entry certificates to the Jewish survivors and pointed out that "if it is to be effective, such action should not be long delayed."40

Although Attlee originally rejected Truman's request, the British decided to call for an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry after Truman made his demands public on September 24, 1945. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who wanted the Jews to return to their previous homelands, hoped that the formation of the committee would enable the British to delay a resolution of the problem of what to do with the refugees and involve the United States in the process of finding a solution. After some discussion, the Anglo-American Committee was set up in November, 1945.41

Jewish Efforts to Reach Palestine
The Holocaust survivors did not wait while the United States and Great Britain discussed their fate. In the spring of 1944, small groups of survivors began organizing in the first areas liberated by the Red Army to discuss their future. They decided that there was no longer any reason for them to return to their former Countries and that emigration to Palestine was their only solution. They were convinced that Antisemitism was still a threat to world Jewry, that another Holocaust would occur, that Jews in the Diaspora had to be warned and properly prepared for this event, and that Palestine had to be built "as an ultimate refuge . . . " for the Jewish people. Plans for revenge against the Germans were also discussed, but became moot under the pressure of events." In December, 1944, these liberated groups came to Lublin, where in January, 1945, they met the former Warsaw ghetto fighters. Together they formed a secret organization called Berihah (Flight). Berihah in Poland soon began smuggling Jews to points on the Mediterranean coasts, where the), would be in a better position to reach Palestine.43

The Jewish Brigade was also involved in getting Jews out of Europe and in transit to Palestine. Established by the British in September, 1944, the Brigade was formed by absorbing a number of Palestinian units serving with the British army. Most of the members of the Brigade were also members of the Haganah, the Jewish armed underground in Palestine. At first, the Brigade began this work independently of the Berihah until they discovered each other.

As soon as the war ended, members of the Brigade began searching throughout southern Germany and Austria for Jewish survivors.44 Everywhere they went, survivors greeted them as heroes. At one DP camp, a survivor tearfully exclaimed, "It is only a dream," while another thanked God "for letting us live to see this day ...... The sight of self- assured Palestinian Jews in military uniform had an uplifting effect on the survivors. Unlike the Allies who had liberated them, members of the Brigade had been eager to find them and give them hope and courage.45 One JDC official noted that there was "hardly a camp" that did "not bear the imprint of a hayyal, a member of the Brigade, who would come and go without fanfare, who would remain for weeks and months at a camp, no one quite knowing how he could arrange his military leave to do it, who lived with and worked for the people."46

From now on, the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) and the Shearit Hapletah (the Saving Remnant) were inseparable members of the Brigade. In a speech to the leaders of the DPs, Major Yigal Kaspi of the Brigade declared: "You are bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh. Our families are overjoyed to know you have survived, and are waiting to welcome you with open and loving arms.... Unite! Be organized and disciplined!"47

The Palestinians recruited several chaplains to work in the Berihah; they were asked to provide material and logistical support. Other chaplains took an active part in helping the Berihah smuggle Jews out of Germany and Austria.48

The efforts of the Berihah resulted in the arrival of a large number of Jews into the American zone of Germany on their road to Palestine. Many had reached Italy, but there was no room for all of them there. The Palestinians decided to divert as many of them as possible to the American zones of Germany and Austria. They would remain there until they could be taken to Palestine, despite the British ban on Jewish immigration. The American zone was chosen because it was a temporary transit area for the refugees and because they would be treated better than in the other zones. It should be noted that the DPs were not always well treated in the American zone. The situation improved only after survivors protested about being treated badly by the American military. In the British zone no additional refugees with a DP status were accepted.49

The American army was disturbed by this influx of Jews because it was responsible for their care. It claimed that it did not have enough supplies and that there was constant pressure to provide Jews with the best accommodations possible. To reduce the confusion, the army wanted the United States government to establish a long-range policy for dealing with these people and these problems.50

Until such a policy was established, "unofficial sources intimated" to American Jewish organizations "that if the monthly influx did riot exceed five thousand, the army would make no difficulties at the border."51

The decision to allow 5,000 Jews to enter the American zone each month was motivated by the Harrison Report. After its publication, public opinion in the United States turned against the military's treatment of the Jews, and as a result the army decided not to thwart Jewish survivors' efforts to enter the American zone. The only effective means to stop the flow was by use of force, and this was not a realistic option for moral and political reasons. It should be emphasized, however, that this action by the army was decided at the highest levels of the Truman administration.

It seems that the army agreed in principle to allow Jews to enter the American zone as early as October, 1945. David Ben Gurion, then chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive in Palestine, was in Germany to meet with the survivors and representatives of the Jewish Agency as well as with Generals Eisenhower and Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff. He met the American generals in October to urge that the Jews be allowed to enter the American zone of occupation and be given the status of displaced persons. Ben Gurion hoped that by "concentrating a quarter of a million Jews in the American zone" it would "Increase the American pressure [on the British] to allow them to enter Palestine." It was "not because of the financial aspects of the problem," he declared; "that does not matter to them-but because they see no future for these people outside of Erez Israel [Land of Israel]."52 Ben Gurion's approach to Eisenhower and Smith, however, was that since a large number of Polish Jews were already infiltrating into the American zone it would be best to allow them officially to enter. Eisenhower and Smith agreed because of the Harrison Report and their concern over future adverse publicity with the DPs.

The American military was eager for the Jews in its zone to move on as rapidly as possible. The presence of these Jews in Germany thwarted America's increasingly pro-German policy. The upper echelons of the army sanctioned this movement of Jews but did not want United States troops compromised or bribed in the process. Moreover, they wanted this operation to be done quietly in order not to arouse British wrath, since the British vehemently opposed the Berihah This meant that the Berihah's activities "had to be done around the American army, not through the American army."53

The Americans were not alone in their concern about the large numbers of Jews entering their zone. The Zionist leadership feared that the survivors might not wait until Palestine was open to them, but would seek admittance to the Western countries. Its fears were based on realistic considerations.54 In a poll taken in earl), 1946 at the Landsberg DP camp, approximately 15 percent of the population indicated that the United States was their first choice for resettlement. The number increased somewhat after the poll was taken, but the trend was halted only when it became clear that the United States was not facilitating DP immigration to America as President Truman had directed.55 Given the choice between going to the United States or Palestine, it is estimated that 50 percent of the Jews would have opted for America.56

Despite these reservations of the Zionist leadership about bringing Jews into the American zone, there was virtually no alternative. In June, 1946, the Berihah increased the flow of Jews into Germany, putting pressure on the United States to allow larger numbers of Jews to enter its zone without being harassed. The Anglo American Committee on Palestine, which submitted its report on April 22, 1946, recommended that Britain immediately admit 100,000 immigrants into Palestine. Haim Yahil, head of the official Jewish Agency mission for Palestine in Germany, feared that the Americans might make emigration of the 100,000 Jews to Palestine conditional on ending infiltration into the American zone. A significant increase of Jews, Yahil believed, might forestall the Americans from doing so.57

Many Jews were eager to enter the American zone of Germany because the committee's recommendations raised their hopes for reaching Palestine. Approximately 40,000 Jews were expected to infiltrate during the three months from July to September, 1946, according to Berihah estimates. Few people anticipated that Britain would refuse to implement the unanimous recommendations of the report, which it did because it "wanted an Arab Palestine with guaranteed rights for a permanent Jewish minority under British protection."58 Various attempts were made by the United States government to arrive at an agreement with Britain over the committee's report, but without success. By early August, 1946, the report was no longer under serious consideration.59

The DPs were shattered by this event. Although they were initially upset that a committee was needed to investigate the problem, they expected that some of the committee's recommendations would be accepted. Now, the issues of Palestine and their own future were unresolved.

At the end of 1945, Truman attempted to admit some Jews into the United States. His efforts were unsuccessful. Despite the suffering endured by European Jews, the United States Congress was in no mood to relax restrictive immigration laws. Rather than initiate a protracted fight to change these statutes, Truman issued an Executive Order on December 22, 1945, which gave the Jews priority on existing quotas already available to DPs. The Polish, Austrian, and German quotas came to approximately 39,000.

Although large numbers of Jews were expected to enter the United States under this arrangement, lower-level bureaucrats in the United States government sabotaged this effort. Between late 1945 and the Displaced Persons Act of July 1, 1948, 45,000 DPs came to the United States zone. Of these, 12,649 were Jews who arrived between May, 1946, and October, 1948. During 1946, 9,000 Jews left Germany legally or illegally.60

The major factor contributing to the increased influx into the American zone was the Kielce pogrom. It has already been noted that assaults against Jews were not uncommon in Poland. Several hundred Jews had been murdered between November, 1944, and October, 1945; others were attacked and wounded. Anti-Jewish riots had broken out in several Polish cities in 1945, but in 1946 the number of riots increased dramatically. The worst occurred on July 4, 1946, with the pogrom at Kielce, in which forty-two Jews were murdered for allegedly using Christian blood for ritual purposes. The Kielce pogrom had a traumatic effect on Jews in Poland because it highlighted their vulnerability. Ominously, it took place in a city of 60,000 inhabitants where the local bishop resided. Moreover, members of the clergy and the local militia took part in this pogrom.

Within three months, 100,000 Jews fled Poland and the surrounding countries. This movement, led by the Berihah,61 took Jews through Czechoslovakia to Bratislava and Vienna. From Vienna they were taken to Salzburg and then either to Italy or the American zone of Germany. Another Berihah route went from Stettin (Szezecin) to Berlin and from there to the West. Berihah operators from Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia continued into 1948, transferring approximately 250,000 survivors into Austria, Germany, and Italy. It was the "largest organized illegal mass movement in the twentieth century."62

Without access to Palestine, however, the Berihah's efforts were not complete. During 1945 and 1946, the Haganah, through the Mossad, its illegal immigration department, took control of all illegal activities in Europe. Shaul Avigur, the Mossad commander, with headquarters in Paris, assumed responsibility for the Mossad, the Berihah and the Haganali in Europe, and for securing arms for the Haganah.63

Under extremely difficult conditions, the Mossad acquired ships, prepared them to take Jews to Palestine, and established a radio communications system. Thousands of survivors of all ages from Germany, Austria, Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, North Africa, and elsewhere risked their lives on these small, overcrowded, and often unseaworthy vessels. In 1946, twenty-two ships brought 21,711 people to Palestine; between August, 1945, and May, 1948, sixty-five ships carried 69,878 Jews to the Holy Land. Without the vast network of camps, transports, and Palestinian Jews, as well as the Support of Italians, French, Yugoslavs, and others who opposed British refusal to allow Jews to enter Palestine, this operation would have been impossible. The result was that only approximately 100,000 of the 300,000 Jews in central and western Europe decided to emigrate to countries other than Palestine.64

Emigration to the United States
For those Jews left behind in Europe who were either unable or unwilling to make the voyage to Palestine, the failure to find a resolution to their statelessness compounded many existing problems. Leo Srole, an American sociologist who served as the UNRRA Welfare director at the Landsberg DP camp, observed that their situation remains abnormal, laden with a heavy weight of anxieties and strains. Their dependent status lowered their self- esteem; their "subsistence" was "considerably below their needs, giving rise to constant insecurity, irritation, and a feeling of deprivation and degradation," and they were extremely apprehensive about being in Germany. They held the Germans collectively responsible for the Holocaust, regarded them as "still Nazi-minded," and feared that "if the Americans were to leave today, we all would be dead by morning."65

The survivors were also disturbed that "in the eyes of American military personnel their status as 'camp inmates'" had "fallen lower, while that of the Germans" had "risen rapidly." In addition, they were haunted by the feeling that their time is running out, that the waste in their lives continues without end. 'The war broke our lives in 1939, and now seven years later the war is still not over for us alone. How long, oh Lord, how long?"66

As already noted, in August, 1946, the British rejected the unanimous recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to allow 100,000 Jewish survivors to enter Palestine. Recognizing that the British might not agree to these recommendations, President Truman began to look for ways to bring the DPs into the United States. In June, 1946, he informed the Grady Commission (a cabinet committee responsible for working with the British to implement the recommendations of the Anglo- American Committee) that the United States could accept 50,000 Jews if the British refused the committee's recommendations. Truman held exploratory discussions with members of the House and Senate committees and with diplomats from Latin America.67

On August 16, Truman announced that he would ask Congress to pass legislation allowing an unspecified number of DPs into the United States. While he thought of permission for 300,000 people, he did not disclose the number publicly. His decision to keep silent on the exact figure was wise. When the American public was asked in late August whether they agreed with Truman's proposal to let more Jews and other European refugees into the United States, 72 percent were against it; 16 percent approved; and 12 percent had no opinion.68

Truman's announcement that he would ask Congress to admit more DPs into the United States increased the quarrels among American Jewish groups over the issue of Palestine. Before the announcement, the non- Zionists, who opposed the establishment of the State, had supported the idea of 100,000 Jews going to Palestine as a humanitarian gesture. Once it appeared that they would not be allowed to go there, they launched a major initiative to bring these Jews to the United States.69

With the aid of many prominent non-Jews, the non-Zionists worked hard for the enactment of the DP acts of 1948 and 1950, which brought over 400,000 DPs to the United States by the end of 1952.70 Approximately 68,000 of these DPs were Jews. Between this legislation and the Truman directive, less than 100,000 Jews reached the United States.71 More might have come to the United States had it not been for Patrick McCarran, senior senator from Nevada. As chairman of the Senate judiciary Committee, McCarran successfully delayed DP legislation so that by the time the DP law was ratified and the Jews were permitted to enter the United States, most had already left for Israel and other countries. McCarran opposed this legislation because he was an isolationist, did not like Jews, and did not get along with his fellow Democrat, President Truman.72

Creation of the State of Israel
When it appeared to the Zionists that the president no longer believed that it would be possible to transfer the Jews to Palestine, they campaigned vigorously for the creation of a Jewish State. One of the first obstacles to this renewed drive appeared shortly after the British rejected the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The British wanted to delay release of the report until they could discuss its contents with the Americans. The Americans refused and on May 1, 1946, when the report was made public, Truman announced his approval of the committee's recommendation that 100,000 DPs be admitted to Palestine. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin immediately protested America's intervention "of unparalleled irresponsibility" during a time of great tension when British soldiers were "being killed by Jewish terrorists.73 Clement Attlee demanded that the United States share the military and financial costs of implementing recommendations in the report; Attlee also stated that the British would not allow large numbers of Jews into Palestine until the illegal Arab and Jewish armies were stripped of their weapons and disbanded.74

These demands were viewed as a challenge in Washington, and when Bevin suggested that an Anglo-American committee of experts be appointed to reconcile the differences between the two countries, Truman agreed. The president, however, opposed the use of American military forces in Palestine and did not want the United States to act as trustee or co-trustee in Palestine.75

The British were eager for American involvement in Palestine, because their general position in the Middle East was eroding. With the anticipated loss of their bases in Egypt and Iraq, the British now needed Palestine. To ensure their continued rule, they felt they had to find a solution to the political future of the country that was acceptable to the Arabs, would suppress the Jewish resistance movement, and would curtail illegal immigration.76

Three different Jewish armed groups were involved in the fight against the British; each group had its own agenda. The largest was the Haganah, which in 1946 had approximately 40,000 members. Under the control of the Jewish Agency, the Haganah's goal was to make sure that the British understood that the Yishuv could thwart any solution against its interests. The IZL (Irgun Zval Leuml, National Military Organization), with 300 fighters and a total membership of approximately 1,500 men, had declared war against the British in 1944. Led by Menachem Begin, the IZL wanted to force the British out of Palestine and establish an independent State. The Lechi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, also known as the Stern Gang, after its founder, Abraham Stern), with a force of about 300 men-of whom 120 were fighters-was the most violent of the three groups. It believed that only violence could drive the British out of Palestine.77

During the autumn of 1945, these three groups joined together to become the Jewish Resistance Movement (Tnuat Hameri). They concluded that the new British Labor government had no intention of allowing any significant number of Jews to enter Palestine or of permitting political autonomy for the Yishuv; therefore, they felt that military action against the English had to be intensified. From autumn, 1945, to July, 1946, these forces sabotaged airfields, railroads, radar stations, oil refineries, bridges, lighthouses, and other military targets. The IZL and the Haganah avoided attacking civilians and most of the time warned the British of an impending assault to prevent casualties.

After the Haganah destroyed most of the bridges connecting Palestine to its neighboring Arab countries on the night of June 17, 1946, the British retaliated with an intensive two-week search of houses, schools, and hospitals throughout the country. It began on Saturday, June 29 (Black Sabbath), and many Jewish Agency officials were rounded up and put into detention. However, the high-ranking leadership was not apprehended. The British also failed to uncover any significant arms caches.78

The British action, nevertheless, did succeed in convincing the Jewish Agency of the futility of continued armed struggle against a superior military force. The Haganah decided to channel more of its energies into illegal immigration. In July, 1946, the Jewish Resistance Movement was disbanded after the IZL blew up a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem that housed the British administration offices. The IZL had warned the British before the explosion, but this information was not conveyed to the other building tenants. The Haganah agreed to the operation, but when more than ninety people died in the explosion, it ended its involvement with the IZL. Both the IZL and Lechi were not deterred by the British; if anything, Black Sabbath increased the IZL's tendency to use violence.79

The British further retaliated against the Yishuv in August by beginning to expel illegal immigrants to detention camps in Cyprus. Approximately 51,000 Jews spent nearly two years in these camps; the Jews were, however, not intimidated by British countermeasures. Their resolve to reach Palestine was only strengthened. Moreover, the image of crisp British naval uniforms rounding up a motley crew of starved and ematiated civilians (including women and children) rebounded against the British.80

While the British forces in Palestine were trying to quell Jewish resistance and place illegal immigrants in detention camps, the Anglo- American Committee of experts was completing its report. On July 31, the report and its recommendations, known as the MorrisonGrady Plan, after Dr. Henry F. Grady and Herbert Morrison (the heads of the two delegations), was released to the British Parliament. The committee proposed that the country be divided into separate Jewish and Arab provinces and that each community have self-rule in domestic affairs, but that the British retain control over foreign relations, defense, police, courts, customs, and communications. A hundred thousand refugees would be admitted to Palestine during the first year the plan was to be implemented, but the British would determine the extent of any future immigration.81

The British government reacted favorably to the MorrisonGrady Plan and initially it appeared that Truman might endorse this proposal. The Zionists recognized that acceptance of this plan would be disastrous, since it would preclude the establishment of a sovereign Jewish State. A meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive was called in Paris on August 2, 1946, to discuss the Zionist response. With the increased arrival of survivors into Germany, the growing demoralization in the DP camps, and the possibility that the Americans might stop trying to influence the British, the Zionist executive decided that a viable partition plan was their alternative counterproposal. This was an extremely difficult decision, but Dr. Nahum Goldmann of the Jewish Agency argued that it was the best of three possible options: bi-nationalism, trusteeship, and partition.82

Bi-nationalism was impractical, Goldmann asserted, because the Arabs would not agree to parity; and even if they did agree to this arrangement, there would be no unanimity on political decisions. Trusteeship would require a British presence, and the English were clearly anti-Zionist. Partition was, therefore, the only viable solution, he concluded, because it would separate the Jews and the Arabs, thus reducing conflict and simultaneously promoting economic competition.83

Goldmann took the partition proposal to the American government and convinced key members of the Truman administration and the American Jewish Committee that this was the only alternative. On August 12, 1946, Truman informed the British that he rejected the Morrison-Grady Plan because "the opposition in this country to this plan has become so intense that it is now clear it would be impossible to rally in favor of it sufficient public opinion to enable this government to give it effective support." Truman pointed out that he wanted to continue to search for a solution and that the American Embassy was prepared to discuss the partition plan advanced by Nahum Goldmann.84

On August 30, 1946, Goldmann asked for a statement from the president or Dean Acheson, acting secretary of state, endorsing partition. The State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed the idea for fear of antagonizing the British and alienating the Arabs.

At first, Truman was also reluctant to issue such a statement, but on October 4, 1946, the eve of Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), he issued a statement which suggested that a compromise between the two proposals would be supported by the American public.85

This statement frustrated the British because they recognized that they could not reach a joint solution with the United States. The British turned to the Jews and Arabs for a last attempt at imposing a new British plan. Both groups rejected the proposal; the Jews because it offered "neither an independent state nor an autonomous province"; the Arabs because it allowed for more Jewish immigration.86 The British government "was caught on the horns of a dilemma," observed one historian. "It was unable to create the State desired by the Zionists for fear of losing its hegemony to one of its many rivals waiting eagerly in the wings; yet, unable either to redeem its promises to the Arabs to create an independent Arab state in Palestine and thus knowingly close the doors to hundreds of thousands of wretched Jewish refugees in Europe awaiting repatriation. With no obvious policy presenting itself, Britain under the new Labor government, drifted along aimlessly, improvising on the White Paper policy, giving no satisfaction to either party, yet arousing the ire of each."87

After this last effort failed, the British handed the problem over to the United Nations in February, 1947. In doing so, the British hoped that the United Nations would ultimately adopt their solution. They expected no western European opposition; furthermore, the Soviets, who were anti- Zionists, would be against a Jewish State, and Latin American countries would not want this new state, in line with the Vatican's opposition to Jewish sovereignty in Palestine.

The British had miscalculated. Public opinion in western Europe was sympathetic to the remnants of Europe's Jews as they struggled to get to Palestine. The Russians desired an end to British rule in Palestine and were willing to support the establishment of independent states in the region. As long as the holy places were accessible and internationalized, the Vatican was amenable to compromise. This meant that Latin American countries could decide for other reasons.88

During the summer of 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine visited Europe and Palestine to recommend a solution to the Palestine question. On August 31, 1947, the committee completed its report, which called for the partition of Palestine.89 On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted by a two-thirds majority to approve the partition of Palestine.90 The Arabs opposed this decision and the Israeli War for Independence began. On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was established.

In early 1949, the war ended with an armistice. By that time, 6,500 Palestinian Jews, about 1 percent of the Jews in the country, had died. By 1950-1951, two-thirds of the survivors came to Israel; the rest went to other countries.91

The Jews paid dearly for their political independence and their return to world history. The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 resulted from several factors. The United States, through President Truman, played a decisive role in keeping the British from implementing their anti-Zionist policy.92 Truman was motivated by his desire to help the remnants of Europe's Jews.93 American Jews, in turn, maintained pressure on American officials and cultivated American public opinion. This meant that the "establishment of the State of Israel and the consequent achievement of a political base for the Jewish people was made possible, to a large degree, by the Jews in the Diaspora: the survivors who organized groups like the Berihah, and American Jewry."94 It also corrected "the impression that the main factor leading to statehood was the activity of the Jewish underground movements in Palestine. All these developments, of course, had built on the fundamental contribution of the prewar Zionist movement-the building up of the Yishuv by three generations of Zionist immigrants."95

This should also correct the unjustified belief that were it not for the Holocaust, Israel would never have been established. It is true that the presence of the DPs in Europe accelerated the formation of the State. At the same time, however, the Holocaust reduced the very possibility of statehood and weakened the new nation. Israel came into the world "smaller and poorer, in the physical and spiritual sense, than she would have, had the huge reservoir of manpower and talent within European Jewry attended her birth and kept watch over her cradle. In her internal structure, in her spiritual life, even in her relationships with her surroundings and in her position among the nations of the world, both as a state and as a people, Israel is still paying the price of the Holocaust."96


1. Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), pp. 98-110.

2. The New York Times, 4.22.45, Section IV, p. 5; 4.25.45, p. 1; 5.39.45, p. 6; Yehuda Bauer, Flight and Rescue: Brichah (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 47, 50-51.

3. PrOLidfoot, Refugees, p. 324.

4. The Jewish Spectator, November 1945, p. 22; The Indiana Jewish Chronicle, 2.1.46, p. 2; The Neu) York Times, 4.17.45, p. 4; 6.27.45, p. 6; Time, 4.30.45, p. 43.

5. Yehuda Bauer, A History of the Holocaust (New York: Franklin Watts, 1982), pp. 337-338.

6. Leo Schwarz, The Root and the Bough (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1949), p. 310; Yiddisher Kempfer, 6.16.45; Forward, 6.15.45; T'khias Hamesim, 5.4.45, a newspaper published by the Jews in Buchenwald, World Jewish Congress Archives, New York, Drawer 272, no file number.

7. Dorothy Rabinowitz, New Lives (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), p. 61; Atlantic Monthly, July 1945, pp. 87-90; Jewish Telegraph ic Agency Daily News Bulletin, 6.10.45, p. 4 and 6.22.45, p. 4; Bauer, Brichah, p. 50; Joseph S. Shubow to Stephen S. Wise, 5.23.45, World Jewish Congress Archives, New York, Drawer 272, File 56.

8. Congress Weekly, 11.30.45, pp. 7-8.

9. Edward N. Peterson, The American occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne state University Press, 1977), pp. 54-55.

10. William Hardy McNeill, Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 582.

11. Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 11.

12. Schwarz, The Root and the Bough, p. 311.

13. Dinnerstein, America, p. 28.

14. Dinnerstein, America, p. 13.

15. Interviews with Abraham J. Klausner, Ann Borden (Liepah), and Marvin Linick. Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem (hereafter referred to as Jerusalem, OH).

16. Administrative Memorandum Number 39 (Jerusalem, OH) Revised 4.16.45, Adviser on Jewish Affairs Archives -Property of Abraham Hyman, Jerusalem, Israel.

17. Interview with Abraham J. Klausner (Jerusalem, OH); Dinnerstein, America, p. 13.

18. Abraham J. Klausner, "A Detailed Report on the Liberated Jew As He Now Suffers His Period of Liberation Linder the Discipline of the Armed Forces of the United States," 6.24.45. Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel (hereafter referred to as CAH).

19. Peterson, American Occupation, p. 87; Interviews with Sylvia Neulander, Herschel Schacter, and Ell Bohnen (Jerusalem, OH).

20. Peterson, American Occupation, pp. 86, 90.

21. Peterson, American Occupation, pp. 86, 90.

22. Dinnerstein, America, p.12.

23. Earl Stone to Philip Bernstein, 10.5.43, Jewish Chaplaincy Archives at National Jewish Welfare Board Archives, New York, Box 3, File A.

24. Alex Grobman, "The American Jewish Chaplains and the Remnants of European Jewry: 1944-1948"(Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University), pp. 51-53.

25. Interview with Abraham J. Klausner (Jerusalem, OH); Leo Schwarz, The Redeemers (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1953), pp. 17-23; Yehuda Bauer, "The Initial Organization of the Holocaust Survivors in Bavaria," Yad Vashem Studies VIII (1970): 148-151.

26. Interviews with Abraham J. Klausner, Ann Borden, and Sidney Burke (Berkowitz) (Jerusalem, OH).

27. Interviews with Abraham J. Klausner, Ann Borden, Marvin Linick, and Zalman Grinberg (Jerusalem, OH).

28. Arieh Tartakower to Judah Nadich, Robert Marcus, Joseph S. Shubow, 6.25.45, World Jewish Congress, New York, File 64, Drawer 272.

29. Leonard Dinnerstein, "The United States Army and the Jews: Policies Toward the Displaced Persons After World War II," American Jewish History (March 1979), p. 356; Dinnerstein, America, pp. 34-36; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Decision (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), p. 311; Gemma Neuman, "Earl G. Harrison and the Displaced Persons Controversy: A Case Study of Social Action" (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1973), p. 160.

30. Interview with Abraham J. Klausner (Jerusalem, OH).

31. The New York Times, 9.29.45, p. 38.

32. Peterson, American Occupation, p. 55; Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), p. 25.

33. The New York Times, 9.29.45, p. 8.

34. The New York Times, 9.29.45, p. 8.

35. The New York Times, 9.29.45, p. 8.

36. The New York Times, 9.29.45, p. 8.

37. The New York Times, 9.29.45, p. 38.

38. The New York Times, 9.29.45, p. 38.

39. Dinnerstein, America, p. 75.

40.Francis Williams, ed., Twilight of Empire: Memoirs of Prime Minister Clement Attlee (New York: A.S. Barnes and Company, 1962), p. 188.

41. Michael J. Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), pp. 183-186, 224.

42. Bauer, Brichah, pp. 3-42; Yehuda Bauer, "Zionism, the Holocaust and the Road to Israel," in The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness, Yehuda Bauer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 62-63.

43. Bauer, Brichah, pp. 3-42; Bauer, Jewish Emergence, pp. 62-63.

44. Ephraim Dekel, B'riha (New York: Herzl Press, n.d.); Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol. 4 (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1972), pp. 622-630.

45. Schwarz, The Redeemers, p. 15.

46. Koppel S. Pinson, "Jewish Life in Liberated Germany, Jewish Social Studies IX (April 1947), p. 117. 47. Herbert Agar, The Saving Remnant)London: Rupert Hart-Davice, 1960), p. 181.

48. Interviews with Eugene Lipman, Abraham J. Klausner, Yosef Miller, Abraham Haselkorn, Eugene J. Cohen, Herbert Friedman, and Meyer Abramowitz (Jerusalem, OH).

49. Bauer, Brichah, pp.66-99.

50. The New York Times, 12.7.45, p. 8.

51. Bauer, Brichah, p. 84. Nahum Goldmann to Stephen S. Wise, 1.8.46, and Gruenbaum to Stephen S. Wise, 1.8.46, World Jewish Congress, New York, File 56, Drawer 272.

52. Bauer, Jewish Emergence, pp. 68-69.

53. Bauer, Jewish Emergence, pp. 68-69.

54. Yehuda Bauer, "The Holocaust and the Struggle of the Yishuv as Factors in the Establishment of the State of Israel," in The Catastrophe of European Jewry: Antecedents, History, Reflections, ed. Yisrael Gutman and Livia Rothkirchen (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1976), p. 620.

55. Leo Srole, "Why the DPs Can't Wait," Commentary (January 1947), pp. 20-21.

56. Gutman and Rothkirchen, Catastrophe, p. 620.

57. John Marlowe, The Seat of Pilate (London: The Cresset Press, 1959), pp. 206-210; Bauer, Brichah, pp. 242-243.

58. Bauer, Jewish Emergence, p. 74.

59. Marlowe, Seat of Pilate, pp. 206-210.

60. Mark Wischnitzer, Visas to Freedom: The History of HIAS (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1956), pp. 207-208, 212-213; Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin, 5.8.46, p. 4; S.R. Mickelsen to joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, n.d., CAH; Irwin Rosen to Philip Rosen, 12.30.46, CAH; The New York Times, 12.23.45, p. 1.

61. Bauer, Jewish Emergence, p. 65.

62. Bauer, History, pp. 341-342.

63. Bauer, Brichah, p. 291.

64. Bauer, History, pp. 343-344.

65. Srole, "Why the DPs," p.22.

66. Srole, "Why the DPs," p. 22.

67. Dinnerstein, America, pp. 102, 114.

68. Dinnerstein, America, p. 115.

69. Dinnerstein, America, p. 117.

70. Dinnerstein, America, p. 255.

71. Dinnerstein, America, p. 25 1.

72.Dinnerstein, America, pp. 217-253.

73. Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), p. 263.

74. Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945-1948 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 65.

75. Ganin, Truman, p. 67.

76. Ganin, Truman, p. 65.

77. Sachar, History, p. 247; Bauer, Jewish Emergence, p. 72.

78. Sachar, History, p. 257; Bauer, Jewish Emergence, p.73.

79. Sachar, History, p. 265.

80. Bauer, Jewish Emergence, p. 73; Bauer, History, p. 346.

81. Sachar, History, pp. 270-271; Ganin, Truman, p. 77.

82.Ganin, Truman, pp. 79, 85, 93.

83.Ganin, Truman, pp. 85.

84.Ganin, Truman, pp. 93

85.Ganin, Truman, pp. 104, 107.

86. Ganin, Truman, pp. 118-119.

87. Cohen, Palestine, pp. 190-191.

88. Bauer, Jewish Emergence, pp. 75-76.

89. Walter, Laqueur, ed. The Israel/Arab Reader (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 109-112; Sachar, History, pp. 280-287.

90. Laqueur, The Israel/Arab Reader, pp. 113-122.

91. Bauer, History, p. 348.

92. Bauer, History, pp. 347-348.

93. Ganin, Truman, pp. 178-179.

94. Bauer, Jewish Emergence, p. 76.

95. Bauer, Jewish Emergence, p. 76.

96. Evyator Friesel, "The Holocaust and the Birth of Israel," The Wiener Library Bulletin XXXII (1979): 59.

For Further Reading

Bauer, Yehuda. Brichah: Flight and Rescue. New York: Random House, 1970.

"The Initial Organization of the Holocaust Survivors in Bavaria." Yad Vashem Studies VIII (1970): 127-157.

The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.

Cohen, Michael J. Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978.

Dinnerstein, Leonard. America and the Survivors of the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Elliach, Yaffa, and Gurewitsch, Brana, eds. The Liberators: Eyewitness Accounts of the Liberation of Christ Killers. Vol. 1. New York: Center for Holocaust Studies Documentation and Research, 1981.

Ganin, Zvi. Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945-1948.

New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979.

Peterson, Edward N. The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977.

Pinson, Koppel S. "Jewish Life in Liberated Germany." Jewish Social Studies IX (April 1947): 101-126.

Proudfoot, Malcolm J. European Refugees. London: Faber and Faber, 1957.

Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976.

Schwarz, Leo. The Redeemers. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1953


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